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Institutional and political forces create strong inertial 
pressures that make updating legislationa difficult task. As a 
result, laws often stagnate,leadingto the continuedexistenceof 
obsolete rules andpolicies that serve long-forgotten purposes. 
Recognizing this inertialpower, legislaturesover the last few 
decades have increasingly relied on a perceived solution-
temporary legislation.In theory, this measure avoids inertiaby 
requiringlegislatorsto choose to extend a law deliberately. 
This Article argues that temporary legislation is a double-
edged sword. While some temporary laws ultimately expire, 
many perpetuate through cycles of extension and 
reauthorization. Temporary legislation often creates its own 
inertialforce, leading to the unintended permanence of what 
was originally believed to be provisional. Using a case study 
from a large public subsidy adopted as a localized fix to a 
temporaryproblem, this Article demonstrates how the subsidy 
has inadvertently grown in scope and in size, creatingits own 
inertialpathways that made its repeal exceedingly difficult. 
Path-dependentdynamics of temporary legislationaffect not 
only present-day policies, but also the ability of legislaturesto 
resist status quo bias and bring about legal change. This Article 
concludes with normative insights on ways to utilize flexible 
rulemakingwhilst circumventing legislative inaction. Careful 
design of expiringprovisionsthat is awareof the inertialpower 
of temporary legislation can effectively ensure that laws are 
kept or discardedgiven their merits, not by force of the past. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long recognized the dangers of statutory 
stagnation.1 Powerful forces create inertia in our laws and statutes, 
leading to perverse and sometimes bizarre results, such as laws that 
criminalize the housing of a pirate or the mailing of a mongoose. 2 
Less amusing, but of deep economic and social import, are a host of 
dated tax,3 sanitary,4 and safety regulations 5 meant to achieve long-
forgotten goals.6 The inertial force of past legislation is explained by 
1 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 10-11 (1982) (noting 
the harms of inertia and proposing that the judiciary is the most suitable actor to hinder 
legislative inertia via adjudication); see also Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalismand the 
Futureof Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOwA L. REV. 377, 472 (2005) ("The degree of 
inertia in the legislative process is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than to 
enact it."); John Copeland Nagle, CorrectionsDay, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282-83 (1996) 
(noting the disadvantages of legislative inertia). But see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 
CaseAgainst JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348, 1389 (2006) (reviewing the current 
criticism of judicial review of legislation and asserting the significance of inertia to 
democracy). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 42, 1716D (2018) (dealing with nonmailable injurious animals); 39 U.S.C. 
§ 3015(a) (2018) (same); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1657 (2018) (dealing with pirates). For a 
humorous overview of prohibited activities that are considered illegal by federal laws today, 
see A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/CrimeADay (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2021); see alsoMIKE CHASE, HOW TO BECOME A FEDERAL CRIMINAL: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HANDBOOK FOR THE ASPIRING OFFENDER 1 (2019) (consolidating these and other examples); 
SHERYL LINDSELL-ROBERTS, K.R. HOBBIE, TED LEVALLIANT & MARCEL THEROUX, WACKY 
LAWS, WEIRD DECISIONS & STRANGE STATUTES 7 (2004) (outlining "[o]utlandish" statutes and 
judicial decisions). 
3 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5053(e), 5674(a) (2018) (prohibiting a person from brewing, tax-free, 
over a hundred gallons of beer for personal consumption); cf. Eliminating Unnecessary Tax 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 9231 (Mar. 14, 2019) (to be codified in scattered parts of 26 C.F.R.) 
(repealing nearly 300 duplicative and obsolete tax regulations dating back to 1942 following 
an executive order signed by then-President Trump to review existing regulations and to 
simplify the Tax Code). 
4Under 9 C.F.R. § 93.415 (2020), removing llama manure from a quarantine facility is 
strictly prohibited unless the llama who made the manure has been released. 
5Under 16 C.F.R. § 1202.4 (2020), it is a federal crime for a matchbook maker to distribute 
matchbooks that fail to comply with a minimum friction strip, a staple size, and certain cover 
requirements. Similarly, 36 C.F.R. § 520.4(g) (2020) prohibits bringing strollers and baby 
carriages into a zoo's exhibit buildings and public restrooms. 
6 See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 336-38 (1990) 
(arguing for the need to subordinate obsolete laws that no longer reflect strong policies); Melia 
Robinson & Erin McDowell, The Most RidiculousLaw in Every State, BUS. INSIDER (June 23, 
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a variety of political and institutional considerations, including 
limited legislative resources, status quo bias, and partisan 
interests.7 Doubtlessly, the inertial pull of these forces is strong. 
To counter legislative inertia, lawmakers have increasingly 
adopted self-terminating legislation. Examples used over the past 
few decades include zero-base budget laws, 8 sunset clauses, 9 
extenders,10  temporary-effects laws," and experimental 
legislation.12 The common denominator of these legislative tools is 
2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/weird-state-laws-across-america-2018-1 
(claiming to identify the strangest statutes still on the books). 
7 See infra Section IIA; see, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, New ConstitutionalIdeas: Can New 
ParliamentaryModels Resist JudicialDominance When InterpretingRights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1963, 1979-80 (2004) (arguing that legislators have a disproportionate interest in ensuring 
specific objectives rather than accommodating individual rights). 
8 See Eloise Pasachoff, The President'sBudget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2210-11 (2016) (noting that, in the 1970s, there was an administrative 
practice of agencies to "use Zero-Based Budgeting to prepare their budget requests-that is, 
to prepare each year's request as if it were starting at zero"). But see David Gamage, 
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
749, 793 n.197 (2010) ("Zero-base budgeting is seldom implemented in practice."). 
9 "Sunset legislation" was coined in the 1970s by Common Cause, a prominent reformist 
group that relied on Theodore Lowi's idea of "tenure of statutes." See Theodore Lowi, Lowi's 
Intent andthe Originof Sunset, RIPON F., Spring 2009, at 27, 27 (explaining how the original 
intent behind Professor Lowi's idea of the "tenure of statutes" was transformed by the group). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a sunset law as "[a] statute under which a governmental 
agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally 
renewed." Sunset Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Yair Listokin, 
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 530 (2008) (advocating for the use of 
sunset provisions as a flexible legislative mechanism). See generally AM. ENTER. INST. FOR 
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION (1978) (describing 
the various reasons for the use of sunset legislation). 
10 See Michael Doran, Tax Legislationin the Contemporary U.S. Congress, 67 TAx L. REV. 
555, 556 (2014) (noting that the tax particularism that today shows up through extenders 
legislation has become a marginal feature of the tax legislative process); Victor Fleischer, Tax 
Extenders, 67 TAx L. REV. 613, 613 (2014) (defining "extenders" as "tax breaks scheduled for 
repeal"). 
1 See Michael Doran, IntergenerationalEquity in FiscalPolicyReform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241, 
292 (2008) (noting that legislatures should limit the scope of their policymaking to policies 
having only temporary effects); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political 
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 253 (2009) (arguing that 
enactment of temporary-effect, rather than permanent, legislation would promote political 
accountability and greater fiscal restraint). 
12 See SOFIA RANCHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 10-11 (2014) (noting experimental lawmaking is beneficial in 
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that they set an "expiration date" for legislation. 13 The traditional 
view is that such measures counter inertia, as they make 
deliberation and intentional statutory action necessary to preserve 
legislation. 
Public choice theorists argue that such measures serve an 
alternative, more sinister purpose.1 4 In their view, temporary 
legislation is a tool to extract rents from industry players. 15 It 
requires interest groups to constantly seek the approval and favor 
times of uncertainty); Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the 
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 303 (1991) (describing a method of experimental 
legislation in which the legislature enacts a standing authorization for agencies to implement 
experimental rules). 
13 While each of these categories portrays different approaches and mechanisms, this 
Article will use the terms "expiring legislation" or "temporary legislation" interchangeably to 
denote laws that expire on their own after a set period of time. See Jacob E. Gersen, 
Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007) (describing temporary legislation 
as statutes containing clauses limiting the duration of their validity); see also William G. Gale 
& Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553, 1554 (2003) (detailing the 
various expiring tax extenders added in the 2001 Bush tax cuts); Elizabeth Garrett, 
Accounting for the FederalBudget andIts Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 194-95 (2004) 
(providing examples of the effects of sunset provisions on budget rules and fiscal policy 
decisions); Manoj Viswanathan, Note, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical 
EvaluationandPrescriptionsfor the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 658 (2007) (determining 
that the effect of tax extenders is to create permanent status through temporary sunsetting 
provisions); AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, supranote 9, at 25 (debating the 
reasons for sunset legislation). 
14 On public choice theory and political rent seeking, see generally Gordon Tullock, The 
Theory of Public Choice, in GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, 
GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 3, 3-6 (2002); FRED S. MCCHESNEY, 
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 1-3 
(1997); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 117-19 (1979); Dennis C. Mueller, PublicChoice: 
A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 395, 396 (1976); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of 
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 226 (1967). 
15 See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The PoliticalEconomy of Sunset Provisions 
in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2006) (describing temporary provisions as "a 
legislative panacea to the ills of modern government" and arguing that it is worthwhile for 
politicians to keep legislation temporary to continue to receive rent payments); see also 
Fleischer, supra note 10, at 624 (claiming that "extenders are bad tax policy" that "enable 
gridlock"); Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does 
What It Is Supposed to Do (andNo More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1465-66 (1997) (arguing that 
public choice theory explains why "legislative incentives" favor "special-interest legislation" 
rather than "diffuse interest[s]"); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice andPublicInterest: 
A Study of the Legislative Processas Illustratedby Tax Legislationin the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 66-68 (1990) (arguing that one of the main legislative motivations is rent extraction). 
1198 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
of legislators so as to not lose their support; indeed, there is some 
evidence to that effect. 16 
However, both the standard narrative and public choice theory 
miss a large part of the picture. This Article argues that temporary 
legislation results in an inertial force of its own. By applying path 
dependence theory to case studies of temporary legislation, this 
Article demonstrates how temporary legislation can often 
inadvertently become permanent-not through intent or design, but 
through the inherent inertial force of such legislation. What public 
choice theorists miss, then, is the fact that so much temporary 
legislation expires1 or becomes permanent,18 in contradiction to the 
supposed interests of legislators to extract rents. 
16 See Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the 
Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 62, 63 (1988) (describing how public choice theory "explains 
why requiring a group of taxpayers to work together on a common tax minimization scheme 
is an effective barrier against the success of the scheme"); Kysar, supra note 15, at 365-66 
(discussing the role of interest groups efforts in extending sunset provisions). 
17 Some examples of temporary legislation that have expired include, but are not limited 
to, laws that date back to the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), which 
permitted the deportation, fine, or imprisonment of anyone deemed a threat or for publishing 
"false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the U.S. government. The Federal Assault 
Weapons Ban-which was added as a subsection of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-2000-prohibited the 
manufacture, for civilian use, of semi-automatic assault firearms with certain large capacity 
ammunition magazines; this ban expired on September 13, 2004. Several of the government 
surveillance portions in the USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) 
expired in 2005 per the Act's "sunset" provision and were not reauthorized until 2011. See 
PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (extending the 
date of the sunset provision). The surveillance portion that lapsed on June 1, 2015 was 
restored in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, 300, until 
December 15, 2019-but it has recently expired again. The Violence Against Women Act of 
1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-24, was signed into law by then-
President Bill Clinton in 1994 and provided government funding to battle and prosecute 
violent crimes against women. VAWA was reauthorized a number of times in 2000, 2013, and 
most recently 2019, but it expired in February 2019. See VA WA FacesHardRoad Ahead, AM. 
B. ASS'N (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental-legislative_ 
work/publications/washingtonletter/august_2020_wl/vawa-update-0820wl/ (outlining 
VAWA's history). 
18 See, for example, the Orphan Drug Tax Credit program-a temporary program enacted 
in 1983 that ultimately became permanent in 1997-which provides subsidies to orphan-
status drugs and biologics that are intended to treat rare diseases that affect fewer than 
200,000 people in the United States. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 
2053-56 (1983) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2018)). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
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Understanding the inertial power of temporary legislation is 
important in its own right. Yet, this Article also offers some first 
steps in identifying elements of the utmost importance to the design 
of optimal policy today and permanence of temporary legislation. By 
recognizing these circumstances, policymakers can better identify 
which temporary measures are more likely to become irremovable 
fixtures and which will be amenable to future change. 
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part II explores the rise of 
temporary legislation. Legislators use this statutory mechanism to 
battle inertia by requiring frequent reassessment of existing law. 
Such reexamination allows legislatures to revisit new information, 
fine-tune policymaking errors, respond to changes in social or 
technological circumstances, and rescind ineffective rules. 19 Some 
also believe that temporary legislation increases government 
oversight by requiring the reevaluation of policies and programs 
and by allowing legislators to collect data before fully committing to 
a permanent new policy.20 Alas, as this Part will demonstrate, in 
some circumstances temporary legislation-a tool meant to curb 
inertia-may inadvertently create its own inertial force. 
Part III lays out the elements of path dependence theory that go 
well beyond the maxim that "history matters" or that our past 
shapes our future. In economics and the social sciences, path 
dependence theory categorically focuses on processes of change.21 It 
attributes historical sequences to institutional patterns, increasing 
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2133 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2018)) reduced 
the orphan drug credit rate from 50% to 25%. At the end of the fiscal cliff in 2012, President 
Obama signed into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 
Stat. 2313, that made 82% of President Bush's tax cuts permanent. See Chye-Ching Huang, 
Budget Deal Makes Permanent82 Percent of PresidentBush's Tax Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL'Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.cbpp.org/research/budget-deal-makes-
permanent-82-percent-of-president-bushs-tax-cuts. 
19 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 529 (claiming that temporary laws may be good 
mechanisms for optimal policy because they make policies more reversible and enhance 
efficient policymaking in the search for an optimal solution). 
20 See, e.g., Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Proceduresand Public Accountability in Sunset 
Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 393-96 (1981) 
(discussing how temporary legislation was intended to increase legislative oversight but 
noting that this mechanism has not always been adequate). 
21 See James Mahoney, PathDependence in HistoricalSociology, 29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507, 
507 (2000) (discussing the difference between general historical analysis and path 
dependence scholarship). 
1200 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
returns dispositions, and deterministic properties.22 Identifying 
path dependence, therefore, involves tracing a given result back to 
reactive sequences-chains of interrelated, unforeseen events.23 
This Part concludes that the ability of decisionmakers to break a 
certain pattern, and divert from a chosen path, critically depends on 
the presence (or lack thereof) of specific dynamics. 
Part IV draws insights from and applies path dependence theory 
using a case study to demonstrate the inertial force of temporary 
legislation. It focuses on a prominent measure in tax law-the 
"research credit" provision-that is a temporary measure meant to 
encourage research and experimentation using large financial 
incentives. 24 Over several decades, this measure faced multiple 
lapses, renewals, and retroactive extensions until it finally became 
permanent.25 The path of the research credit followed "critical 
junctures" that provided opportunities for lawmakers to choose 
between two or more policy options.26 Once a selection was made, it 
created inherent inertial forces via "reactive causal sequences" of 
frequent cycles of extension and renewal with dynamics of 
"increasing returns" and "positive feedback" that helped entrench 
this policy and prevent diversion from the initial choice. 27 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 In some cases, path-dependence studies focus on "deviant cases" that have rare or unique 
outcomes that could not have been predicted otherwise. See Mahoney, supranote 21, at 508 
(describing several deviant cases that are commonly studied in path-dependence theory). 
24 The research credit, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2018), was added by Section 221 of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47. 
25 See infra Appendix; cf. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Lessons in CyclicalFiscalActivism, 48 CONN. 
L. REV. 873, 878 (2016) (detailing the historical circumstances of the creation and repeal of 
another form of temporary legislation, the Investment Tax Credit). 
26 See infra Section III.A; see also Douglas J. Puffert, PathDependence, Network Form,and 
Technological Change (arguing that path dependence can be influenced by a priori 
determinants such as technology, factor endowments, preferences, and institutions, as well 
as specific contingent events), in HISTORY MATTERS: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 63 (Timothy W. Guinnane et al. eds., 2004); 
Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
HistoricalAnalysis ("[T]he branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow."), 
in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 19, 28 (Mark Irving 
Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997). 
27 See infra Part V; see also Mark J. Roe, Chaos andEvolution in Law and Economics, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 641, 645-47 (1996) (pointing to the effectiveness and strength of the chosen 
pattern as determining the ability to break out of such pattern); Paul Pierson, Increasing 
Returns, PathDependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) 
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Thereafter, Part V reveals that non-profits and associations that 
organize the collective action of constituents (who benefit from the 
path) "self-reinforced" that choice (as well as their existence) and 
helped curb legal change or diversion from the path.28 With these 
elements present, the research credit, intended in 1981 to be a 
temporary four-year measure, has persisted to the present because 
the cost of switching to an alternative has become too high.29 
What was meant to be a temporary measure to address a 
localized social issue is now the source of large and established 
subsidies. Today, almost 18,000 companies collectively receive over 
$12.5 billion through the research credit program.30 Whether this 
policy is effective is not the issue; rather, the main point is that such 
a large and consequential program arose due to unintended inertial 
forces created by legislation originally designed as a temporary fix. 
This Article concludes with some suggestions regarding more 
effective ways to use temporary rulemaking whilst circumventing 
legislative inertia. Legal scholarship that incorporates path 
dependence theory can provide important insights on recent 
expiring legislation. 31 It proposes adopting certain mechanisms and 
default rules to allow experimentation with expiring provisions 
while avoiding statutory constriction through inertia. 
(defining positive feedback as the condition in which a path dependence is created within a 
polity); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of 
ComparativeDevelopment: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1373-77, 
1395 (2001) (exemplifying increasing returns dynamics). 
28 See Pierson, supra note 27, at 260 (arguing that organizations have a strong tendency to 
persist due to self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes). 
29 See Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the EssentialFacilities 
Doctrineand the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 
508 (2007) (describing the ability of increased switching costs to entrench customers); see also 
Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (discussing high constitutional inertia due to the extremely 
high "transaction costs" of changing constitutional policy). 
30 See SOI Tax Stats - CorporationResearch Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-
tax-stats-corporation-research-credit (last updated Sept. 10, 2020) (select Tax Year 2014 
under "Table 1: Corporations Claiming a Credit, by Industrial Sector"). 
31 For a list of current expiring provisions in the tax context, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, JCX-1-20, LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2020-2029 (2020), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5240; see also Darla Mercado, 
These Three Tax Breaks for 2018 Are Still Up in the Air, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2019, 10:10 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/06/congress-has-yet-to-approve-these-valuable-tax-breaks-
for-2018.html (naming mortgage insurance, debt forgiveness of foreclosure, and tuition fees 
for higher education as temporary legislation that were up for renewal for the 2018 tax year). 
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Legislative inertia permeates many areas of the law.3 2 The 
staying power of past decisions can go well beyond present-day cost-
benefit analyses. Path dependence theory serves as an important 
avenue to explain not only the destiny of a legislative route but also 
to potentially open new frontiers of legal research and point our 
attention to overlooked paths and sequences. 33 Temporary 
legislation is not formed in a void; it is often created when critical 
national concerns exerted pressure on legislators to achieve 
economic or social outcomes. 34 Yet, once these exigencies are 
removed, rules and procedures-as well as organizations that rely 
on their existence-may preserve and expand their paths to invite 
more participants and increase their returns. These path dynamics 
may lock in temporary measures initially designed to prevent 
legislative inertia and encourage change, creating unintended 
consequences and becoming rooted in our legal system. 
II. LEGISLATIVE INERTIA 
[Inertia], or innate force of matter, is a power of 
resisting, by which every body, as much as in it lies, 
endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it 
be of rest, or of moving uniformly forward in a right 
line.35 
-Isaac Newton 
In physical science, dormant objects and those that move in a 
straight line at a constant speed will continue resting or moving 
32 See, e.g., supranotes 1, 18, 29-31. 
33 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Patternof 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOwA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (examining the 
common law concept of precedent from a path dependent doctrine); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of PathDependence in CorporateOwnershipand Governance, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (discussing path dependence theory in relation to initial choices of 
incorporation); see also Lim, supra note 29, at 508 (describing the lock-in created when 
switching costs from one software to another are too high); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, PathDependencein CorporateContracting:IncreasingReturns, HerdBehaviorand 
CognitiveBiases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348 (1996) (exemplifying the use of a contract term 
by firms, noting that the more people utilize that term, the greater the benefit from it). 
34 See Gersen, supra note 13, at 255-57 (providing examples of important social policies 
that came about as a result of temporary legislation). 
35 ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA 1 (Andrew Motte trans., Prometheus Books 1995) (1687). 
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unless a force interrupts them.36 In the legal context, inertia 
describes the preservation of the status quo. 37 Continuity and 
evolution are both crucial to the stability of any legal system.38 
Modern law has to be functional as well as responsive to financial 
and natural crises.39 Changing circumstances may render statutes 
inconsistent with new social or economic landscapes. Obsolescent 
laws prevent legislatures and courts from harmonizing legal rules 
with present-day conditions and the demands of shifting 
majorities.40 Given continuous demands for legal reform nowadays, 
it is worth asking: what causes legislative inertia? Why do various 
aspects of the law persist? 
A. THE SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE INERTIA 
Many facets of inertia reflect a status quo bias that legislatures 
must overcome in order to enact a law. 1 In their seminal 
manuscript, The Legal Process, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks 
36 See, e.g., Christopher Gresov, Heather A. Haveman & Terence A. Oliva, Organizational 
Design, Inertia and the Dynamics of Competitive Response, 4 ORG. Sc. 181, 182 (1993) 
(describing inertia as the property of a system that continues to move in straight line unless 
acted upon by external force). 
37 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2013) (discussing the 
effect of automatic enrollment in creating inertia in people's choices and noting that "[i]n view 
of the power of inertia and the tendency to procrastinate, people may simply continue with 
the status quo"); see also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY 249 (1990) ("The courts are the legal embodiment of political inertia."); Chris William 
Sanchirico, Tax Inertia: A General Framework with Specific Application to Contemporary 
Business Tax Reform, 69 TAx L. REV. 135, 140 (2016) (describing "tax inertia" as the "tax 
considerations that weigh against a decisionmaker's choice to switch from a status quo 
investment to an alternative"). 
38 CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 3. 
39 Cf. Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 426 (2011) (exploring 
responsive regulation in the tax area and noting the value of deregulatory reforms that follow 
principles of responsive regulation). 
40 See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, CalabresianSunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1756 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE 
AGE OF STATUTES (1982)) ("Anachronistic laws, whether statutory or judicial, must be 
eradicated. . . . Consequently, judges should be entitled to rework legislative enactments to 
keep them in line with the current social and legal landscape."). 
41 For example, take the legal doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let 
CongressDo It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
177, 190-91 (1989) (discussing the obstacles and inertia created by the doctrine). 
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argued that lawmakers have a natural inclination to legislative 
inaction, as "other measures have a stronger claim on the limited 
time and energy of the [legislative] body."42 They recognized the 
perils of attributing "the weight of government inertia on the side of 
social inaction rather than of action."43 The U.S. government, in 
their opinion, has reached its highest state of development, and the 
vested interests that coincide with institutional inertia are already 
aiming toward achieving their settled objectives. 44 Taking a 
different view, Ronald Dworkin stated that legislative inertia stems 
from a lack of sufficient legislative time and priorities. 45 Limited 
available time during legislative sessions, he claimed, prohibits 
legislatures from passing new laws, even though legislators 
acknowledge the need to do so. 46 Similarly, this failure to move 
forward results in unsatisfactory consideration of existing statutes. 
In his book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Guido 
Calabresi professes that over the last half-century, the United 
States has gone, from a system governed by the common law, 
through a process of "statutorification" by which written laws came 
to dominate our legal system. 47 One of the side effects of this 
process, he acknowledges, is that legislative inertia became a real 
and substantial phenomenon that threatens the integrity of the 
law.48 He declares that we cannot continue "liv[ing] with aging 
statutes and rely[ing] on time to render them totally irrelevant."49 
While updating legislation would be the optimal solution, Calabresi 
42 Henry M. Hart Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making 
and Application of Law 1395 (1958) (unpublished manuscript). 
43 Id. at 875. 
44 See id. at 115 ("[I]n American society all the forces both of vested interest and 
institutional inertia which are on the side of maintenance of existing institutions are on the 
side also of steadily more effective . . . achievement of their settled objectives."). 
45 See Ronald Dworkin, PoliticalJudges and the Rule of Law ("Legislative time is a scarce 
resource, to be allocated with some sense of political priorities ... "), in ARGUING ABOUT LAW 
193, 200 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009). 
46 See id. ("[I]t may well be that a judicial decision would be overruled if Parliament had 
time to pass every law it would like to pass, but will not be overruled because Parliament 
does not."). 
47 CALABRESI, supranote 1, at 1, 5 ("[W]e have become a nation governed by written laws."). 
48 See id. at 34 ("Legislative inertia ... [is] a fact of life ... "). 
49 Id at 80. 
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acknowledges that the legislature is not always up to the task.50 
Instead, he proposes a theory that empowers the judiciary to defeat 
legislative inertia by transferring the burden of upholding an 
obsolete law to those seeking to rely on it.51 Namely, he asserts that 
courts have better interpretative tools than legislatures for reading 
statutes in a manner consistent with the current legal framework. 52 
Nevertheless, Calabresi also warns about making legislative 
changes too often.53 He argues that if all statutes are reexamined de 
novo every so often, it will create imbalance in lawmaking. 54 Too 
much change, he worries, will create a statutory modern world with 
little continuity. 55 By the same token, Professor Daniel Farber has 
determined that legislative inertia is of "fundamental" 
importance. 56 He argues that in order to gain the benefits of 
stability, we must maintain some degree of "legislative inertia" in 
our system.5 7 Accordingly, he proposes that we include statutory 
inertia in our search for optimal legislative decisionmaking. 58 
Others reiterated this idea, claiming that we should stop treating 
legal inertia as a pathology reflecting democracy's malfunction. 59 
Some legal scholars that have explored the sources of legislative 
inertia have blamed the power of institutional constraints and 
5O See id. at 62 (arguing that the legislature is not the proper "institution or body ... [to] 
entrust[] with the job of determining which laws and rules need renovation or 
reconsideration"); Nagle, supranote 1, at 1286 (describing Calabresi's approach to legislative 
inertia). 
61 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 2, 82-90 (explaining his proposed common-law-based, 
burden-shifting approach to judicial review of statutes). 
52 See id. at 5-6 (arguing that judicial activism is the result of the legislature's incapacity 
to keep laws up to date). 
53 See id. at 1 (arguing that, as statutes become the primary source of law, courts and 
legislatures have reacted to preserve continuity and change in the law). 
64 See id. at 60 ("If all statutes and constitutions were to be reexamined de novo every so 
often, a totally new balance in lawmaking would be established. . . "). 
55 See id. ("Instead of a system designed to achieve continuity and change in a modern, 
statutory world, we would have a system that gives us change and little continuity."). 
56 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 
281, 308 (1989) (describing the benefits of legislative inertia). 
67 See id. ("[T]he agenda rules and institutional structures that create legislative inertia 
are themselves fundamental to the workings of legislatures. Without these constraints and 
constructs, legislatures would be plagued by instability and would be unable to function as 
deliberative bodies." (footnote omitted)). 
58 See id. ("It is not at all clear that a democratic system could function otherwise."). 
59 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 1, at 1389 (asserting the significance of legislative inertia). 
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partisan political dynamics for creating blind spots and blockages 
in the legislative process.60 Others have described legislative 
stagnation as deriving from the high costs of legislative change. 61 
Multiple levels of congressional approval create costs related to 
placing an item on the legislative agenda, learning about relevant 
issues, and reconciling different opinions on the optimal policy. 62 
Surmounting these obstacles and enacting change is not easy. It 
requires overcoming a presumption in favor of the existing state of 
affairs.63 Overcoming this status quo bias involves attending to 
competing considerations in a way that is more challenging than 
merely protecting the existing state of affairs. 64 The degree of 
inertia in the legislative process is extensive, therefore, because 
impeding legislation is far less costly than passing it.65 
Commentators have identified two main categories of legislative 
inertia: priority-driven and coalition-driven. 66  Priority-driven 
inertia arises from "the time-consuming nature of the law-making 
process" and the need to prioritize the number of changes the 
legislature can enact within a legislative session. 67 Legislators have 
a packed agenda involving a variety of complex issues. Resolving 
these matters requires a large time commitment and policy 
expertise. Representatives who seek reelection must devote the 
majority of their time and energy to constituency service. 68 This 
6o See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1, at 1282-83 (noting that legislative inertia can "block[] 
amendments that have no significant opposition"); Adler, supra note 1, at 472 ("The degree 
of inertia in the legislative process is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than 
to enact it."). 
61 Cf. Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (discussing high constitutional inertia due to the 
extremely high "transaction costs" of changing constitutional policy). 
62 See id. at 530-31 (discussing the costs of "multiple levels of [statutory] approval"). 
63 See id. at 484 ("Policymaking ... often involves the choice between a new policy and the 
status quo. Generally, new policies have highervariance in outcomes than existing policies."). 
64 See id. at 523 (discussing "status quo bias" as a barrier to new policies). 
65 Adler, supra note 1, at 472; cf. also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical 
Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 389 n.1 (1988) 
("Continuing resolutions are funding devices enacted whenever Congress is unable to pass 
one or more of the thirteen regular appropriation bills by the end of the budget cycle."). 
66 See Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form JudicialReview, 38 CARDOzo L. REV. 
2193, 2209-11 (2017) (describing these two forms of legislative burdens of inertia). 
67 d. at 2209-10. 
68 See id. at 2210 ("Capacity constraints ... will mean that there is little reason .. . for 
legislative majorities to give priority to rights-based claims which are advanced by a 
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leaves little time to devote to considering and leading major 
legislative change. 69 Legislators and their aides often lack the 
expertise to resolve complicated questions and have only limited 
legislative time and resources. 70 Moreover, legislators do not want 
to risk alienating more constituents than they befriend by opining 
on controversial questions. 71 Their priorities are to support and, at 
the right times, to propose new legislation. This provides them with 
an institutional power of inertia by refusing to attend sooner to 
certain policy problems in need of legislative attention. 72 This power 
is especially relevant in cases where legislators inherently cannot 
anticipate unintended consequences and future problems that may 
develop with the adoption of a proposed law.73 
Aside from exogenous factors that create priority-driven inertia, 
coalition-driven inertia involves internal political dynamics. 74 The 
more cynical commentators claim that legislators deliberately 
choose not to make difficult policy decisions for political reasons. 75 
Coalition-driven forms of inertia arise due to the dynamics of 
relatively small minority, if those claims do not command strong majority support."); DAVID 
R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 116-17 (1974) (discussing the scope of 
time and energy devoted to constituency services). 
69 See Richard Pierce, InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 919 
(1985) (surveying the different reasons for legislative inertia). 
70 See id. (noting representatives have limited time to be prepared and to ensure the 
interests of constituents are met). 
71 d. 
72 See Maxwell L. Stearns, StandingBack from the Forest: Justiciabilityand SocialChoice, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1319 (1995) ("[L]egislatures are free not to decide issues presented to 
them for consideration in the form of bills. In other words, legislatures, unlike courts, have 
the institutional power of inertia." (footnote omitted)). 
7 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 720 
(1969) (arguing that agency policymakers "must decide many major questions that could not 
have been anticipated at the time of the statutory enactment" because of lawmakers' inability 
"to write meaningful standards that will be helpful in answering such major questions"); 
Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1982) (noting situations where Congress was unable "to anticipate 
the advent of a major structural innovation"). 
7" See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("Coalition-drivenforms of inertia will arise in the 
legislative process as a result of . .. the dynamics of competition between political parties."). 
7 See Pierce, supra note 69, at 919 ("More cynical observers claim that Congress chooses 
not to make hard policy decisions for political reasons."). 
1208 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
competition between political parties.76 The desire to appeal to a 
broader electoral base inherently promotes inertia by encouraging 
politicians to adopt a legislative agenda that does not divide party 
members.77 Accordingly, legislators push aside and assign low 
priority to legislative changes that do not enjoy strong majority 
support.78 Michael Perry claims that the "burden of legislative 
inertia" involves the difficult task "of capturing the attention of a 
sufficient number of legislators, of surviving various institutional 
hurdles (such as committee votes), [and] of winning the support of 
a majority of legislators" by those seeking either to enact or repeal 
a certain law. 79 
Legislative inertia substantially limits statutory reform. It can 
block legislative change even if "no significant opposition" exists.80 
For example, if a legal rule is up for reauthorization in the future, 
coalition- and priority-driven inertia can disincentivize legislative 
action. 81 This Article next demonstrates that legislative inertia can 
develop in the context of temporary legislation when statutory 
reassessment frequently happens. It begins by reflecting on a 
number of explanations invoked for the adoption of temporary 
legislation instead of a permanent law or mere legislative inaction. 
B. A REMEDY AND ITS UNINTENDED PATH 
Temporary legislation has provisions that fix the expiration of 
the law or regulation within a predetermined period.82 Such 
provisions automatically repeal the legislation when it is no longer 
76 See Rosalind Dixon, A DemocraticTheory of ConstitutionalComparison,56 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 947, 968 (2008) (discussing coalition-driven inertia); supranote 74. 
77 See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("If party members ... are divided on an issue, this 
can mean that legislative party leaders have an interest in keeping an issue off the legislative 
agenda-even in the face of clear demands for legal change .... "). 
78 See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the 
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 654-55 (2003) (noting that legislators avoid making 
decisions that will displease major constituencies). 
79 MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 304 (1988). But see Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, andPragmatists,87 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (2003) (pointing 
to the advantages of inertia "[i]n times of highly divisive environmental politics"). 
80 Nagle, supranote 1, at 1282-83. 
81 See id. at 1282 ("If a statute is coming up for reauthorization in three years, that can 
operate as a disincentive against acting to solve a particular problem now."). 
82 See supranotes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
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necessary because it has fulfilled its purpose or achieved its desired 
effect.83 Prior to its expiration, temporary legislation is subject to 
congressional evaluation to extend or repeal it.84 The following 
Section will describe how temporary legislation was initially viewed 
as a way to improve public administration, tackle excessive 
bureaucracy, reverse l gislative inertia, manage emergencies, and 
lessen regulatory pressures. Thereafter, it will reveal how 
unintended consequences ensure that temporary legislation may 
not always deliver its goal. 
1. Temporary Legislationand its Promise. The idea of temporary 
legislation is not new. Thomas Jefferson strongly promoted 
legislative dynamism by proposing that all statutes and 
constitutions should last no more than nineteen years. 85 In the First 
Congress, James Madison proposed that the Impost Act, which 
imposed import taxes, should contain an expiration clause.86 In 
their eyes, excessive stagnation and obsolescence were ill-favored, 
and the government's role was to balance competing concerns for 
continuity and change. 87 American political scientist Theodore Lowi 
is considered the "father" of the temporary legislation movement in 
regulations, statutes, and agency rules.88 In his book The End of 
83 See, e.g., Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the FederalIncome Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 319, 334 (2003) (discussing the efficacy of zero-based budgeting rules as a way to 
eliminate ineffective programs); Eyal-Cohen, supranote 25, at 878 (discussing the birth, life, 
and death of the investment tax credit as a temporary tax program). 
84 See supranote 20 and accompanying text. 
85 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789) ("Every constitution 
then, [and] every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is 
an act of force, [and] not of right."), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382, 385 (Charles 
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
86 See Gazette of the United States (May 20, 1789) ("Mr. Madison observed, that it was 
incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution . . . to pass a revenue law unlimitted [sic] in 
its duration.. .. "), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 676, 676 (Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen 
E. Veit eds., Johns Hopkins University Press 1992); see also Caleb Nelson, Originalismand 
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 540 & n.94 (2003) (reviewing the founders' 
debates and analyzing their justifications for rejecting the idea of perpetual laws). 
87 Nelson, supra note 86, at 541; see also Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-
Based Failuresof the CriminalLaw Througha CriminalSunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 
1327, 1357-58 (2008) (reviewing the letter exchange between Jefferson and Madison 
regarding Jefferson's sunset proposal). 
88 See Lowi, supra note 9, at 27 (discussing the original intent behind Professor Lowi's idea 
of the "tenure of statutes"). 
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Liberalism, he proposed enacting a "Tenure-of-Statutes Act" that 
would put a five- to ten-year termination date on all statutes that 
create federal administrative agencies.89 Lowi believed his reform 
proposal furthered "juridical democracy" and combatted "interest-
group liberalism."9 0 He proposed improving government efficiency 
and the integrity of laws by limiting the power that interest groups 
exerted over administrative agencies. 91 Lowi suggested that a 
legislature should routinely obtain a renewed justification for laws 
as an agency's termination date approached. 92 
However, the idea of enacting expiring legislation was not the 
popular consensus. Instead, promoting stability and flexibility was 
prioritized through the practice of enacting statutes intended to 
persist indefinitely unless actively repealed. 93 Expiring legislation 
thereafter emerged as a reaction to general discontent with 
unrestrained governmental growth, excessive bureaucracy, and 
massive public spending. 94 The use of such legislation spiked during 
the early 1970s in response to the unprecedented growth in the 
number of administrative agencies and their powers. 95 The mid-
1970s saw a steep rise in the enactment of expiring legislation at 
89 THEODORE J. LOwI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF 
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309 (1969). 
901d. at 311 (denoting interest-group liberalism as a public philosophy that creates 
clientelism via the broad expansion of public programs such as the New Deal). 
91 1d. at 309-13. 
92 Id. at 309. 
93 See Kysar, supranote 15, at 350-55 (describing the history of the sunset movement and 
noting that legislators in the 1970s who supported agency oversight did not necessarily back 
the idea of automatic expiration). 
94 See Frank H. Easterbrook, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip K. Howard, Thomas W. 
Merrill & Jeffrey S. Sutton, Showcase PanelIV A FederalSunset Law: The FederalistSociety 
2011 NationalLawyers Convention, 16 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 339, 341 (2012) (statement of Prof. 
Thomas W. Merrill) (discussing Lowi's "tenure of statutes" act idea and how a reform group, 
"Common Cause," has seized it and changed it to a sunset laws movement); see also Mark B 
Blickle, The NationalSunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 209, 210-12 (1985) (noting 
that widespread disillusionment with government bureaucracy led to the popularization of 
sunset laws). 
95 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 329-30 (1981) 
(noting that sunset legislation was a widely supported method to force increased oversight); 
Kysar, supranote 15, at 353 ("[Lowi's] ideas became very influential in the mid-to-late 1970s 
during a period of fiscal hardships and pervasive doubt about the efficacy of government 
programs."). 
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the state level via laws that were passed in hopes of abolishing 
redundant programs and agencies. 96 
Notably, scholars have often discussed expiring legislation in the 
context of legislative entrenchment as representing a mirror image 
of two different approaches. 97 Legislative entrenchment denotes 
"the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules that 
are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same 
form."98 For example, an entrenching clause could require a 
supermajority to repeal a rule, which prevents a later legislature 
from rescinding the statute. In a similar manner, expiring 
legislation prohibits statutes from remaining in force when future 
legislatures do nothing or refuse to repeal it.99 The anti-
entrenchment doctrine-which holds that legislatures cannot make 
irreversible policies-supports temporary legislation as a 
mechanism to avert entrenchment.0 0 
Accordingly, lawmakers viewed temporary legislation as 
furthering the principle of separation of powers by limiting the 
legislative powers of Congress to shorter periods and mandating 
96 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 354 ("By the early 1980s, thirty-five states had adopted 
broad sunset laws."). 
97 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L.J. 1665, 1665-66 (2002) (maintaining that entrenchment is the mirror image of 
expiring legislation, thus the anti-entrenchment doctrine is inconsistent with Congress's 
undisputed authority to enact temporary laws). But see Listokin, supra note 9, at 535 
(explaining, in contrast to Posner and Vermeule, "why entrenchment is barred while sunset 
clauses are legitimate from an economic perspective"). 
98 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1667; see also Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 
559 (1879) ("Every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with 
respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification 
which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *90 ("Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent 
parliaments bind not."). 
99 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1697 (discussing "a handful of congressionally 
enacted rules that attempt to control the courts' interpretation of enactments by subsequent 
Congresses"). 
100 See, e.g., John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchmentof OrdinaryLegislation: 
A Reply to ProfessorsPosnerand Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1784-85 (2003) ("A sunset 
clause frees future legislatures from being constrained even by the existence of a law. The 
new legislature in essence gets to decide de novo how to proceed. That is exactly the opposite 
of entrenchment, which restricts the ability of a future legislature to decide at all." (footnote 
omitted)). 
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reconsideration and reapprova. 101 They used temporary legislation 
to curb legislative inertia by conferring a temporary and dynamic 
character to law.102 The sustained legitimacy of a rule or a program 
depends upon a succeeding legislative decision. Placing temporal 
limits and dispositions on a legal rule or agency curbs the duration 
of government powers and guarantees more frequent dialogue 
between a legislature and its constituents.103 By confirming that 
laws and rules will be either terminated or reevaluated, expiring 
provisions are viewed as improving political accountability and 
transparency.10 4 They can avert inertia and status quo bias by 
compelling reexamination of inefficient laws.105 
Harmonizing these ideas, expiring legislation has been used to 
restore legislative oversight. All statutes that change the legal 
status quo de facto shift the burden of inertia from the enacting 
legislature to future legislatures.106 The operation of temporary 
legislation dictates habitual reevaluation. These periodic 
determinations pressure future legislatures to decide by a specific 
date whether a particular rule, program, or agency should persist.10 7 
These evaluations should look into the effects of the legislation and 
101 See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State Experience, 50 PUB. 
ADMIN. REv. 49, 55-56 (1990) (studying the extent to which states actively utilize and review 
expiring legislation and suggesting "[t]he utility of Sunset as a legislative oversight 
mechanism"). 
102 See Doran, supranote 11, at 293 (noting the responsibility of lawmakers to consider how 
fiscal policy will affect those in the future, but also that "we have no good answers"). 
103 Cf. Gersen, supra note 13, at 298 ("The [temporary] legislative form produces both 
informational and distributive benefits, which affect the selection of optimal public policy and 
the distribution of authority in government."). 
104 See Davis, supranote 20, at 406 (concluding that accountability is improved in laws with 
expiring provisions). 
105 See, e.g., supranote 17 (outlining the assault weapon ban, the Violence Against Women 
Act, and the government surveillance portions of the USA PATRIOT ACT as examples of 
temporary legislation that expired and were not reauthorized); see also Listokin, supra note 
9, at 551 (noting that expiring provisions can prevent inertia in inefficient corporate contract 
provisions). 
106 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1697 (comparing temporary legislation and 
the anti-entrenchment doctrine); Gersen, supra note 13, at 262-63 (discussing temporary 
legislation transaction costs and their allocation between current and future legislatures). 
107 See Mark D. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: CongressionalReauthorizationof the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853, 854 (1978) ("'Sunset' is the 
popular term for a statutory method of forcing a legislature to make a periodic determination 
whether to allow a particular program or agency to continue."). 
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whether its objectives are being met efficiently. Those requesting an 
extension to avoid a technical renewal process bear the burden of 
proof to renew the legislation post-expiration. Consequently, 
temporary legislation helps balance the need to adapt to rapidly 
changing conditions and to maintain the proper legislative 
oversight. 
Temporary legislation can also be used to modernize the law by 
updating obsolete laws or by eradicating redundant ones. Social 
practices and perceptions change over time, and what was 
considered unacceptable in the past may be commonly 
acknowledged today.108 For example, federal criminal laws still 
prohibit shooting a fish from an airplane,109 selling Swiss cheese 
with too few holes,110 and consulting with a pirate.1 Temporary 
legislation can help maintain the balance between continuity and 
change while avoiding errors and obsolescence via reexamination.11 2 
Laws with expiring provisions prevent a past majority from 
perpetuating its dominion by shifting the power to those who oppose 
those laws and requiring legislative action, rather than inaction, to 
maintain them.113 Expiring legislation thereby imposes fiscal and 
political costs on future legislatures seeking to preserve the 
consequences of the earlier acts. It places the burden of legislative 
action "on those who wish to retain" a legal rule "rather than on 
108 See supranote 2 (referring to various sources of over 800 obsolete rules and regulations 
that criminalize obscure behavior and are currently still in effect). 
109 A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Feb. 1, 2019, 7:08 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/1091488611269332993 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 742j-
1(a)(1)). 
110A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:47 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/699409673615712256 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 
343(g) and 21 C.F.R. § 133.195(a)(1)). 
111 A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Dec. 6, 2015, 7:31 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/673661122273263616 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1657). 
112 See Nathan Cortez, RegulatingDisruptiveInnovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 219 
(2014) ("[Temporary legislation] decrease[s] the costs of premature or incorrect regulation by 
time-limiting the damage they can inflict."). 
113 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 61 ("It ... deprives a past majority of the benefit of 
inertia and gives it to those who object to the laws."). 
1214 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
those who wish to modify or destroy it."11 4 That way, inertial forces 
might not "serve the dead hand of the past."11 5 
Professor Yair Listokin views the practice of expiring provisions 
as Congress recognizing that greater flexibility is needed than is the 
norm in that policy area.116 On the other hand, when greater 
stability is needed, ordinary statutes seem to achieve that result.11 7 
According to Listokin, all policies are, in a way, temporary because 
new policies replace them.11 8 Expiring legislation merely decreases 
ex ante the cost of changing policies by reversing the law by 
default.119 Temporary laws make policies more reversible in the 
search for optimal legislation. Listokin views them as 
"unambiguously positive," as they enhance efficient policymaking 
while justifying the adoption of policies with negative expected 
value. 120 In his opinion, temporary legislation should be encouraged 
and used more to allow lawmakers to reduce legislative costs, gain 
practical knowledge, and learn about the benefits of a bill before 
committing to irreversible costs. 121 Legislators may be more inclined 
to adopt temporary legislation and gather more evidence on risks 
and effects during the interim period between enactment and 
expiration before committing to a permanent new policy. 122 
114 Id. at 60. 
115 Id. at 60, 62 (noting that the expiring legislation mechanism does not guarantee 
anachronistic laws will not get reenacted because "[t]ime does not serve as a good indicator 
of age" and noting that "[i]t does not distinguish sufficiently between those [legal rules] in 
need of reconsideration because they have become anachronistic and those" that are not). 
116 Listokin, supranote 9, at 536. 
117 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1672 ("The 'default'-that statutes persist 
until repealed-creates a compromise between stability and flexibility, but this balance is 
more appropriate for some policy areas than others. Indeed, Congress recognizes as much 
when it provides certain statutes with sunset provisions, reflecting the view that greater 
flexibility than the norm is needed in that policy area."). 
118 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 535 ("In some sense, almost all policies have sunset 
clauses-policies automatically lapse when new policies on the same subject are instituted."). 
119 See id. ("Sunset clauses therefore enhance the reversibility of policies."). 
120 Id. at 536 ("Suppose that there are multiple policies that should be tried in a given order 
under the optimal search approach. Passing each of these policies in succession would be 
costly.... These costs may well prevent policymakers from choosing policies according to the 
optimal search approach's prescriptions."). 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 533 (discussing the advantage of temporary legislation in the optimal 
legislative search process); see also Gersen, supra note 13, at 248 (noting the information 
benefits and error costs saved via temporary legislation). 
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A prominent illustration of this view is the use of temporary 
legislation to regulate crises. Wars, natural disasters, and threats 
to public order are exigencies that require swift lawmaking. The 
most notable type of temporary legislation in such circumstances is 
"emergency legislation." 12 3 Emergencies tend to be temporary and 
thus necessitate measures that terminate when the exigency ends. 
To guarantee the discontinuance of an exceptional rule, temporary 
legislation is used to prevent normalization of a state of emergency 
and to enable legislatures to return to normalcy. 124 Accordingly, 
scholarly literature has viewed the use of temporary legislation as 
a good compromise during the suspension of constitutional 
protections in light of severe emergencies. 125 It provides a form of 
legislative oversight of emergency powers, restrains extraordinary 
measures from being standardized, and contributes to building 
consensus around potentially controversial measures. 
Counterterrorism legislation is a prominent case study of such 
temporary legislation. In counterterrorism legislation, an inevitable 
tension emerges between democratic process and prompt response 
to emergencies. 126 In times of grave national peril, the government 
tends to concentrate authority and power to gain control of the 
situation. 127 The government may limit fundamental rights 
guarantees and enact possibly extreme measures to protect citizens 
against perceived severe threats. 128  Temporary emergency 
123 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1058 (2004). 
124 See id. at 1037, 1047 (arguing temporary legislation is a good solution to the tension 
between the state of emergency and individual constitutional rights); cf. Oren Gross, Chaos 
andRules: ShouldResponses to Violent CrisesAlways Be Constitutional?,112 YALE L.J. 1011, 
1090 (2003) (noting that emergency legislation may become "normalized and made routine" 
and claiming that temporary legislation is not an effective rule to deal with emergencies). 
125 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 523, 529-32 (1992) (maintaining that temporary legislation provides a good outlet for 
political compromise). 
126 Cf. Ackerman, supranote 123, at 1039 ("Terrorist threats do not trigger the existential 
rationale, but require the articulation of a different framework for emergency power."). 
127 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving TelecommunicationsSurveillanceLaw, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 287, 305 (2008) (discussing the lack of limits on the FBI's new power resulting from 
laws enacted in response to the September 11th attacks). 
128 See Gross, supra note 124, at 1023 ("[T]here may be circumstances where the 
appropriate method of tackling grave dangers and threats entails going outside the 
constitutional order, at times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles, 
rules, and norms."). 
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legislation provides a safeguard and may resolve some of this 
tension. 129 Emergency legislation typically expires after a specified 
date unless the government renews the legislation or replaces it 
with new laws through the normal legislative process. 130 In the 
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, there has been a 
huge increase in the use of temporary legislation to tackle 
international terrorism. 131 The USA PATRIOT ACT was passed 
swiftly and contained many expiring provisions that supposedly 
limited the Act's impact on constitutional rights. 132 This temporary 
legislation provided a mechanism to limit the duration of a hastily 
adopted law through extraordinary delegation to the executive 
branch, to deliver opportunities for gathering empirical data, and to 
conduct policy reassessment after a set period. 133 
Achieving consensus around contentious legislation is not easy. 
Alienated lawmakers and political resistance create high hurdles to 
ensure continuity of legal regimes. 134 Temporary legislation 
provides opportunities for political haggling and reaching consensus 
129 See Ackerman, supra note 123, at 1045 ("Bad legal structures will channel temporary 
needs for reassurance into permanent restrictions on liberty; good structures will channel 
them into temporary states of emergency, without permanent damage to fundamental 
freedoms."). 
130 See, e.g., Antonios Kouroutakis & Sofia Ranchordas, Snoozing Democracy: Sunset 
Clauses,De-Juridification,andEmergencies, 25 MINN. J. INT'L L. 29, 53 & nn.110-12 (2016) 
(citing the United Kingdom Parliament's reasoning for adoption of temporary emergency 
legislation). 
131 See Emily Berman, The Paradoxof CounterterrorismSunset Provisions,81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1777, 1790 (2013) (arguing that the high expectations for post-9/11 counterterrorism 
temporary legislation have not been borne out in terms of results). 
132 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (including a sunset provision whereby certain provisions of the Act 
would "cease to have effect on December 31, 2005"). 
133 See Berman, supra note 131, at 1824 (describing the enactment of the USA PATRIOT 
ACT and noting that the House agreed to vote on the bill "on the condition that it would be 
temporary legislation"); John E. Finn, Sunset ClausesandDemocratic Deliberation: Assessing 
the Significance of Sunset Provisionsin Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 442, 485 (2010) (reviewing the enactment of the USA PATRIOT ACT, stating that 
temporary legislation "appear[s] when there are concerns about the potential abuse of newly 
adopted powers and a corresponding desire for legislative oversight"). 
134 See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of 
the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 254-55 (2008) (claiming that expiring legislation is 
important for building coalitions in times of political divide). 
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among legislators fearing the potential long-term negative effects of 
certain laws. 135 Representatives who oppose a particular law will be 
more amenable to passing "erase and rewind" laws that provide 
some default assurance that the law will expire and reinstate the 
previous status quo.136 To conclude, temporary legislation is 
instrumental in reaching political compromise, facilitating 
experimentation, gathering information, and assessing risk. 
2. Criticism and Increased Inertia. In the past few years, 
academics have criticized temporary legislation. They have 
condemned the routine extension of temporary legislation without 
meaningful evaluation. 137 Instead of expiring after its designated 
date, temporary legislation more frequently is extended and 
expanded numerous times. 138 Scholars have argued that the 
number of expiring provisions is too excessive and that they are 
counterproductive, create a disproportional review burden, and 
increase statutory uncertainty. 139 Temporary legislation has been 
viewed by these scholars as serving primarily as a mechanism to 
pressure opponents of a controversial bill to vote in favor of a 
40 temporary version. 1 Others have described these laws as 
135 See id. at 257 (discussing coalition building for statutes lacking overwhelming support). 
136 See Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian 
Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 337 (2014) 
(analyzing the political advantages of temporary legislation). 
137 See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
138 For example, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 has been extended three times 
and is currently pending reauthorization. See supra note 17; see also Yin, supra note 11, at 
232-33 (reviewing the history of some temporary tax legislation and its repeated extension); 
Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1016 (2011) ("Congress 
renews the vast majority of [tax] extenders upon the sunset date or shortly thereafter on a 
retroactive basis."). 
139 See Kysar, supranote 15, at 369, 396 (discussing negative consequences of temporary 
tax legislation). 
140 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 809, 827 (2019) ("The 
uncertainty they create disrupts the planning activities of public and private actors, 
increasing compliance costs and distorting investment decisions."); Berman, supra note 131, 
at 1824 ("Compromises are therefore easier to reach for legislation with a sunset than for 
long-term legislation."). But see Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal 
Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 562 (2007) ("Sunset clauses, providing for automatic 
repeal of the statute, sometimes indicate that Congress is uncertain whether a statute will 
be beneficial."). 
1218 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
"democracy snooze buttons." 141 Instead of countering legislative 
obsolescence, temporary legislation postpones the decisions to a 
later date. 142 
Expiring legislation has also been described as inefficient, 
expensive, and contributing to standardizing extraordinary 
measures. 143 Many expiring laws have been reauthorized numerous 
times so as to have the effect of permanency. 144 The repeated 
extensions of counterterrorism and fiscal legislation are classic 
examples of temporary laws that became entrenched and that now 
receive minimal reexamination. 145 Calabresi warned that without 
substantive review, temporary legislation will "defeat itself." 146 
Legislators can create legislative procedures (such as acts extending 
141 See David A. Fahrenthold, In Congress, Sunset Clausesare CommonlyPassedbut Rarely 
Followed Through, WASH. POST. (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-
congress-sunset-clauses-are-commonly-passed-but-rarely-followed-through/2012/12/15/9d8e 
3ee0-43b5-11e2-8e70-e1993528222d-story.html ("Washington's current crisis reveals that 
the sunset clause has become something unintended: democracy's snooze button."); see also 
Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and 
Carbon Taxes (criticizing temporary legislation for its effects on democracy), in THE TIMING 
OF LAWMAKING 130, 143 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017); cf. Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe 
& David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and 
Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1975, 2003-04 (2015) (viewing expiring 
legislation as a "democratic deficit"). 
142 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 378 (noting that temporary legislation was "regarded as 
inevitable" in budget reconciliation). 
143 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 1051-65 (discussing the disadvantages of temporary 
legislation); see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Processes,43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 874 (2002) (criticizing the use of expiring legislation 
as a gimmick to circumvent budget rules). 
144 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 379-80 (noting the functional permanency of temporary 
tax legislation). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychologyand 
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 603-06 (2002) (noting that expiring 
legislation can be beneficial in affording frequent examination of rules that the public 
considers to be the status quo). 
145 See Gross, supra note 124, at 1090-91 (noting that expiring legislation increases the 
risk of normalizing emergency legislation); see alsoBerman, supranote 131, at 1781 (arguing 
that expiring legislation is inappropriate for dealing with terrorist threats because the 
reconsideration is not substantial and is not made with fully informed policy). 
146 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 61-62 ("[W]e would be right back where we started, 
with obsolete laws being automatically reenacted under a special procedure, much as today 
some fiscal statutes, which could give an occasion for reconsideration of the programs they 
fund, are treated so as to make any substantive review unlikely."). 
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numerous sunset provisions in bulk) that treat the periodic 
reexamination as a mere formality. 147 
Several theories of democracy highlight the significance of 
deliberation by legislators and citizens in the political process, 
rather than emphasizing the mere aggregation of preferences. 148 
Deliberative democracy is important because preferences change 
over time. The central problems of democratic government, as 
pointed out by the Founders, were the influence of factions (interest 
groups) and the self-interested incentives of representatives during 
49 congressional deliberation. 1 Accordingly, scholars viewed an 
integral part of defending democracy to be opposing political 
interests by rebuking the influence of technocratic elites on 
legislators.150 Indeed, scholars have described the interaction 
between legislators and interest groups around expiring legislation 
as a rent-extracting mechanism. 151 Using public choice theory, 
experts have argued that politicians and special interest groups 
began using temporary legislation as a "guise" in order to pass bills 
that otherwise would not obtain sufficient support.152 
147 See id. at 61 ("[I]t would be but a short step to a legislative procedure that would treat 
the periodic reexamination or reenactment as a mere form."). 
148 See Posner & Vermeule, supranote 97, at 1692 ("Laws do not (or should not) simply 
aggregate preferences; they should emerge from a deliberative process involving citizens and 
legislators, in which preferences change in response to argument and experience."). 
149 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(describing how "the multiplicity of interests" and "the multiplicity of sects" can prevent the 
concentration of power); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-45 (1985) (providing a thorough account of the Madisonian ideas 
regarding the influence of factions). 
150 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 10-11 (1991) (expressing concern for the influence of political interest groups 
on legislators in light of Madisonian ideas). 
151 See John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship,Public Choice, and 
Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, the Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrotor Stick or 
JustNever Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 613, 636 (2002) (noting temporary 
laws increase legislators' rent-seeking opportunities). For examples of the rent-extracting 
issues associated with sunsets, see Kysar, supra note 15, at 339-40; Kysar, supra note 138, 
at 1043; Viswanathan, supra note 13, at 680; cf. Gersen, supra note 13, at 285 ("Temporary 
measures could produce less rent seeking in the aggregate because the prize for winning a 
statute is less valuable."). 
152 See Viswanathan, supra note 13, at 658 (arguing that sunsets result from "political 
maneuvering" to enact "permanent legislation under the guise of an ostensible expiration 
date"); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures 
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In the field of tax law, Professor Rebecca Kysar noted that many 
sunset clauses were added to the tax code during the George W. 
Bush Administration as gadgets to underestimate the real revenue 
cost of legislation and fit it within budget constraints. 153 Because 
the estimation of revenue costs of permanent tax provisions is too 
high for Congress to pass them, temporary provisions are used to 
bypass that issue by taking into account only the revenue costs 
during the period up until expiration. 154 Alas, the intention remains 
to perpetuate this temporary legislation, thus indirectly 
circumventing budget constraints. 155 
The consensus-gathering feature of expiring legislation has 
turned into one of its central points of criticism. 156 Evaluations of 
legislation close to the expiration date became too cumbersome, 
making the renewal process autogenetic and technical. 157 Some 
scholars have viewed temporary legislation as a political shortcut to 
the traditional congressional legislative process and as delaying 
Distort Our Budget and Our PoliticalProcess, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010) ("I do not 
agree that temporary-effect legislation will reduce the present value of tax subsidies to 
legislators angling for campaign contributions when viewed through the prism of 'interest-
group' theory."). 
153 See Kysar, supra note 140, at 853 (explaining how the Bush tax cuts were a "fiscal 
illusion" because they "would likely be renewed without full accounting of their costs"); Kysar, 
supranote 138, at 1040-41 (noting how legislators analyzed costs of legislation outside of the 
budget window when considering the Bush tax cuts). 
1
5
4 But see Kysar, supra note 138, at 1041 ("[I]nterest groups, constituents, and political 
ideology may spur congressional members to heed the full costs of legislation and to downplay 
misleading official costs-thus reconciling, to an extent, the accounting differences between 
temporary and lasting legislation."). 
155 See Kysar, supra note 140, at 854 ("[B]udget rules that Congress created were later 
circumvented when Congress found the pressure to deliver legislative benefits too great."); 
Kysar, supra note 138, at 1019 ("Reconciliation ... also induces legislators to use sunset 
provisions."). 
156 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1692 (explaining how sunset provisions only 
work when the current Congress can achieve consensus); see also Chris Mooney, A Short 
History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF. (Jan.-Feb. 2004), 
https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/story-mooney janfeb04.msp 
(criticizing temporary legislation for becoming "a clever political trap"). 
157 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 1066 (explaining some difficulties with renewal of 
temporary legislation); Mooney, supra note 156 (providing an example of how sunset 
provisions can trap later legislators into renewal). 
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discussions to the moment of expiration. 158 These repeated 
extensions with minimal or no reevaluation effectively have 
increased legislative inertia.159 But why has expiring legislation 
maintained such strong institutional bias in favor of the temporary 
status quo? 
While discussing entrenching statutes, Posner and Vermeule 
commented in passing that earlier legislatures always have greater 
power than later ones by virtue of making policy choices that de 
facto become entrenched through path dependence and inertia.160 
The next Part will delve into the theoretical underpinnings and 
dynamic forces encompassing temporary legislation that create 
conditions for path dependency and inertia. 
III. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY 
Inertia is the final stage in a path dependent sequence, namely a 
situation of "lock-in." 161 Yet, path dependence theory entails more 
dynamics than just a structural status quo. 162 First, one must 
understand this theoretical framework before applying it to the 
legal context and, specifically, to temporary legislation. 
Previous choices can influence our current selections, regardless 
of whether conditions today still warrant them.16 3 The QWERTY 
158 See Gersen, supra note 13, at 268 (asserting that "temporary legislation allows long-
term policy commitments to be delayed"); Kysar, supra note 138, at 1028 (claiming that the 
history of temporary legislation demonstrates the political pressures for spending and tax 
cuts lead to manipulation by legislators); see also Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, Policy 
Persistence, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1328 (1999) (noting the significance of status quo bias 
as political pressure on legislators builds). 
159 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1696-97 ("The problem is that any statute 
changes the legal status quo and thereby shifts the burden of inertia from the enacting 
legislature to future legislatures."). 
160 See id. at 1676 ("[U]pstream legislatures always have greater de facto power than 
downstream ones, simply by virtue of drawing on a slate that is more nearly blank. They 
make policy choices that become entrenched de facto through path dependence and inertia."). 
161 See generally S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, PathDependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (defining path dependence and lock-in at length). 
162 See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 70, 77 
(1989) (describing "structural inertia" in organizations as involving the comparisons of rates 
of change and resistance to structural change). 
163 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supranote 161, at 222-23 (discussing the role the past plays 
in current economic conditions). 
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typewriter is cited as one of the most notable examples of both path 
dependence and network effects. 164 Created in 1873, the QWERTY 
keyboard layout has been so entrenched by users over the years that 
it continues to dominate the market despite the existence of better 
layouts.165 This example illustrates a path that has become so 
entrenched that the cost of switching to a different route has become 
prohibitive. 
Scholars have used path dependence theory to explain unique 
present-day phenomena. 166 Economist Paul David argued that 
understanding the rationale (or lack thereof) for the world around 
us is difficult unless we investigate how we arrived at this state. 167 
W. Brian Arthur, who developed the modern economic approach to 
path dependence, has hypothesized that the theory encompasses 
knowledge-based industries with strong externalities. 168  He 
describes path dependence as "lock-in through learning" but claims 
that small differences in early patterns or "historical events" may 
result in path divergence and will often produce large variations in 
final outcomes. 169 
Identifying path dependence involves tracing a given result back 
through a chain of chronicled events that are unforeseen and cannot 
164 See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332-36 
(1985) (describing the entrenchment of the QWERTY keyboard layout over more efficient 
alternatives); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A ContrarianView, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
577, 580 (1999) (noting the circumstances of the QWERTY typewriter and different 
alternatives over the years). 
166 See David, supranote 164, at 333-34 (describing the history of the QWERTY typewriter 
and other options available throughout the years and why those options were not adopted). 
See generally CHARLES E. WELLER, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE TYPEWRITER (1918). 
166 See, e.g., Roe, supranote 27, at 644-46 (using the American corporate structure's history 
to argue that the possibility of breaking out of a lock-in situation lies in the overall efficiency 
and strength of the pattern created in the past); Lim, supra note 29, at 508 ("Consumers 
become 'locked in' to the product because of switching costs associated with moving from one 
network to another."); see also Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in 
InternationalCriminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 908 n.369 (2005) ("Path dependence 
processes may lock institutions into alternatives that are less efficient or optimal than 
others."). 
167 See David, supranote 164, at 332 ("[I]t is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or 
illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it got that way."). 
168 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989) (describing, for instance, the path dependence 
of the nuclear industry). 
169 Id. at 126, 128. 
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0be classified solely based on prior historical conditions. 17 Some of 
those cases have unique and unpredictable outcomes. 171 The 
following provides some basic definitions of the various elements of 
path dependence along with clarifying illustrations. The 
scholarship on path dependence recognizes everal dominant 
dynamics that contribute to the conservation of a route: critical 
junctures, reactive sequences, self-reinforcement, increasing 
returns, positive feedback, and lock-in. 172 
A. REACTIVE SEQUENCES AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
Does the order and correlation between historical events matter 
to the creation of the path? Economist Douglas Puffert claims a 
notable characteristic of a path-dependent process is the incidence 
of reactive sequences. 173 He states that a process of economic 
allocation is considered path dependent when the sequence of 
allocations relies "not only on fundamental, a priori 
determinants . . . but also on particular contingent events." 174 
170 For example, in the Polya urn experiment, two balls-one red and one black-were 
placed in a large urn. The experiment proceeded by removing one ball and returning it to the 
urn accompanied by an additional ball of the same color. This process was repeated until the 
urn was full. The experiment demonstrated that an early draw, although random, had an 
increasing effect on the final result. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 510-11 (describing the 
Polya urn experiment). 
171 See, e.g., Greg Hill, History, Necessity, andRational Choice Theory, 9 RATIONALITY & 
Soc'Y 189, 198-200 (1997) (describing an experiment with a "Polya coin" which shows the 
effects initial outcomes have on latter ones). 
172 See Scott E. Page, PathDependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 88 (2006) (identifying conditions 
for path dependence in an economy that faces different technological choices). 
173 See Puffert, supra note 26, at 63 (discussing how economic allocation is determined by 
both initial factors and subsequent contingent events); Douglas Puffert, Path Dependence, 
EH.NET, https://eh.net/?s=path+dependence (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (further describing 
path dependency and the effect of subsequent contingent events). Page distinguished between 
path dependency and phat dependency. Page, supra note 172, at 89. He claimed that, in a 
phat-dependent process, the order of events does not matter. Id. He exemplified the Polya 
Process as being phat-dependent and not path-dependent because, in that experiment, the 
order in which balls are taken out of the urn does not matter. See id. at 91 ("[O]utcomes in 
the . . . Polya Process do not depend on the order of past events. They only depend on the 
distribution over those events. Put in the formal language of this paper: the Polya Process is 
phat-dependent but not path-dependent."). 
174 Puffert, supra note 26, at 63. These determinants include "technology, factor 
endowments, preferences, and institutions." Id. 
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Reactive sequences are series of causally connected events that 
are "reactive," as each occurrence is partly "a reaction to temporally 
antecedent events." 175 Accordingly, each event is "dependent" on 
prior steps or occurrences to form the path of an outcome. 176 The 
difference between a reactive sequence with observed path-
dependent trajectory and a simple chain of causally connected 
events lies in the historical, critical juncture that set the chain in 
motion. 177 In a reactive sequence, early significant events trigger 
other events, not by repeating a given pattern, but by initiating a 
series of firmly connected reactions and counterreactions. 178 How 
can we observe a chain of interconnected occurrences in the 
lawmaking context? 
The legislative process encompasses everal reactive sequences. 
For example, representatives sponsor a legislative proposal and 
then the bill is assigned to a committee for study. 179 After approval 
by the committee, the bill is put to a vote and, if passed by a majority 
of the House, moves to the Senate.180 In the Senate, the bill is 
assigned to another committee, voted on by that committee and, if 
passed, prompts the creation of a conference committee of House 
and Senate representatives, which reconciles differences between 
the two versions of the bill. 18 1 The reconciled bill is brought for final 
approval at the House and Senate and for presentation. 182 The 
President hen has ten days to sign or veto the enrolled bill.18 3 Other 
than executive orders, the President cannot sign a bill into effect if 
175 Mahoney, supra note 21, at 509. 
176 Id. at 510. 
177 See id. (arguing path-dependent processes must have properties of contingency marked 
by a process of inherent sequentiality). 
178 See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 
14 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 72, 85 (2000) (claiming that initial disturbances are crucial because 
they trigger "action and reaction [that] shift the system in a new direction"). 
179 See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. NO. 108-93, at 8-16 
(2003), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc93/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc93.pdf 
(describing in detail the legislative process in the United States). 
180 Id. at 27-38. 
181 Id. at 42-45. 
182 Id. at 50. 
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (la t 
visited Mar. 12, 2021). 
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the first event-the proposal to enact it-has not occurred.184 The 
presidential veto or signature into law is thus highly dependent on 
the success of the preceding stages. Every occurrence in this 
reactive sequence is both responsive to previous events and the 
cause of subsequent actions. Early incidences in the sequence 
matter because a small change can significantly affect how the 
sequence unfolds. 185 For example, if the vote on the floor fails, the 
rule might be directed to congressional committees for further 
deliberation, or it could be abandoned altogether. Temporary 
legislation reinforces these observations as each extension is 
contingent upon the expiration of the previous one. Moreover, 
extensions of provisions scheduled to expire are often "reactive" 
because such events are, to a certain degree, unforeseen-especially 
during periods of political divide or major legal reform. 186 Yet, not 
all temporary legislation is inevitably path dependent. 
Spotting reactive sequences is not enough to identify path 
dependence. Another important element in the formation of the 
entrenched route is the existence of critical junctures. Critical 
junctures are moments during which a specific arrangement is 
adopted from among at least two or more alternatives. 187 These 
crossroads are "critical" because once a specific path is chosen, it is 
costly and difficult to return to the initial point when other 
alternatives were available. 188 
Social scientists utilize counterfactual analysis in evaluating 
critical junctures by using thought exercises that envision how 
history would have unfolded had an alternative path been chosen. 189 
184 See JOHNSON, supra note 179, at 51. 
185 See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1987) ("Tiny differences in 
input could quickly become overwhelming differences in output-a phenomenon given the 
name 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions."'). 
186 See supranote 17 and accompanying text. 
187 Mahoney, supranote 21, at 513. 
188 Id.; see alsoLevi, supranote 26, at 28 ("Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree .... From 
the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is 
possible to turn around . .. the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to 
follow." (footnote omitted)). 
189 But see Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin, CounterfactualThought Experiments in World 
Politics:Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives ("Social scientists ... have 
also long been aware of the pivotal role that counterfactuals play in 
scholarship . . . . Nevertheless, some contemporary historians still sternly warn us to avoid 
'what-might-have-been' questions."), in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD 
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During the period immediately preceding the critical juncture, 
various dynamics influence the decision of which path to take. 
Counterfactual analysis maintains that if, during that time, the 
final result can be easily predicted, then that sequence ought not be 
viewed as path dependent.190 On the other hand, if the final outcome 
is causally connected to the prior conditions, that sequence may be 
viewed as path dependent. 91 Such counterfactual exercises can 
delineate the importance of a critical juncture by demonstrating 
that choosing a different path would prompt a significantly different 
result. Yet, oversimplified, far-fetched, imaginary "what-if' 
exercises should be avoided. Instead, we should compare only 
alternative options that were truly viable and "on the table" at the 
time of the critical juncture. How do we get from a critical juncture 
to the final outcome? Investigating causal connections requires 
consideration of the following other path dynamics. 
B. STATUS QUO BIAS THROUGH INCREASING RETURNS AND 
POSITIVE FEEDBACK 
The term "increasing returns" refers to a condition whereby the 
more often a decision or a choice is made, the more prominent its 
advantages because of the increasing number of persons that select 
that route.19 2 For example, with today's complex technology, we 
frequently observe increasing returns as more people choose to 
adopt a technological innovation, gain more experience with this 
innovation, and help improve its operation.19 3 Accordingly, a notable 
effect of path dependence is that a minor benefit or unimportant 
lead for certain technology can result in irreversible influences on 
the ultimate market allocation of resources. For example, when two 
or more smartphone manufacturers (e.g., IBM and Apple) compete 
for the same market of potential adopters, trivial actions such as 
POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (Philip E. 
Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996). 
190 Mahoney, supranote 21, at 537. 
191 Id. 
192 Pierson, supranote 27, at 252-53. 
193 See Arthur, supra note 168, at 116 (exploring the dynamics of allocation under 
increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally through agents 
choosing between competing technologies). 
2021] UNINTENDED LEGISLATIVE INERTIA 1227 
product launching events may inadvertently give one product a 
market advantage over the other, providing exponentially growing 
experience as more customers choose that product.1 94 This is an 
example of increasing returns. 
A similar phenomenon, "positive feedback," denotes positive 
externalities formed when the same decision is made by other 
individuals. 95 There is an advantage for people whose decision is 
the predominant one.196 Positive feedback may seem similar to the 
dynamics of increasing returns, but it varies mathematically. 197 
Increasing returns describes a market in which advantages grow 
exponentially as market share increases and more players make the 
same choice. 198 Positive feedback implies enhancement of value to 
those that already own a product or made a choice. 199 Stated 
differently, positive feedback is a small reward given to market 
players themselves who previously chose that option.200 
194 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 161, at 214-15 (noting that the causes of 
increasing returns are varied as the cause may be a result of either economies in production 
(supply side) or network effects (demand side)). 
195 See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 21 
(2004) (describing path dependence as "referring to social processes that exhibit positive 
feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development"). 
196 For example, the more consumers use a certain software, the more applications are 
written to accompany that software and improve the software's features, which attracts more 
users to purchase the software. See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in 
Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 182 (2004) (describing positive feedbacks 
created when more users adopt Microsoft Windows software). 
197 See Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary 
Political Science (noting that what economists call "increasing returns" could generally 
describe self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes), in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF 
THE DISCIPLINE 693, 699-703 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002); see also Pierson, 
supra note 27, at 251 ("For some theorists, increasing returns are the source of path 
dependence; for others, they typify only one form of path dependence."). 
198 See Pierson, supranote 27, at 252 ("In an increasing returns process, the probability of 
further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path. This is because 
the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over 
time."). 
199 See Page, supra note 172, at 88 (explaining that positive feedbacks are like "little 
bonuses given to people who already made that choice or who will make that choice in the 
future"). 
200 See id. at 88 (defining positive feedback dynamics in path dependence); Mahoney, supra 
note 21, at 511 (providing examples of positive feedback). 
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It is worth noting here the differences between positive feedback 
and network effects, which are often conflated. Network 
externalities, or network effects, is a phenomenon whereby the 
value consumers place on goods increases the more others use those 
goods. 201 Network effects are also referred to as "positive network 
externalities" (a term that surely adds to the confusion) or demand-
side economies of scale, since each additional customer enhances the 
value of the network and changes the shape of the demand curve. 20 2 
For example, the value of participation in a network of computers 
has been observed to grow significantly with the size of the 
03 network.2 Network effects have played a major role in legal 
reasoning and discussions in various areas of the law-such as 
antitrust law, intellectual property law, corporate law, and contract 
law-because they affect the behavior of participants in the 
market.20 4 Alas, positive feedback does not involve being part of a 
all.205  network at Rather, the value of goods increases as 
201 Kolasky, supranote 164, at 579. 
202 See id. (claiming that economists have focused primarily on the negatives of network 
effects and the ways they may lead to market failure). 
203 See id. at 580 ("[P]ositive network effects exist when the utility of the network (and 
therefore its value) increases as output grows."). 
204 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetwork Economic 
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 481-85 (1998) (detailing the scholarship on network effects in 
various areas of the law); see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility,75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 425 (1985) (arguing that if network 
effects diminish social welfare, then courts should consider legal doctrines to remedy these 
market failures); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97-100 (1994) (describing market actors' behavior in hardware/software 
markets). Lemley and McGowan named two main types of network effects-actual networks 
and virtual networks-that diverge based on the extent to which the goods provide inherent 
value to a consumer apart from any network characteristics. Lemley & McGowan, supra, at 
488-94. They wrote, "The greater the inherent value of the good relative to any value added 
by additional consumers, the less significant the network effect." Id. at 488. "Actual 
[n]etworks," as they called them, encompass "products whose entire value lies in facilitating 
interactions between a consumer and others who own the product." Id. Examples of products 
with actual networks include telephones, fax machines, and language. Id. at 488-89. "Virtual 
[n]etworks," on the other hand, provide increased value when there are additional users of 
identical or interrelated products. Id. at 491. For example, as more customers use a specific 
software and auxiliary applications, existing users benefit from better file sharing and 
services. See id. at 491. 
205 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 204, at 495 (emphasizing that "[b]y definition, 
[positive effects] do not exhibit network effects"). 
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consumption rises, even where goods are not themselves 
connected.206 Thus, although positive feedback is similar to network 
effects because they both deliver increasing value to participants, 
the concepts differ in how that value is added. Apart from positive 
feedback, other dynamics are also important in reinforcing a path. 
C. SELF-REINFORCEMENT AND LOCK-IN 
A "self-reinforcement" sequence can be characterized by 
reproduction that strengthens earlier events.207 Self-reinforcement 
portrays a condition in which once a decision has been made, it 
creates complementary institutions that maintain that path and 
08  reassure its perpetuation. 2 Accordingly, in self-reinforcing 
sequences, initial strides in a specific path motivate additional, 
similar steps such that it becomes difficult to divert from that 
path.209 "Lock-in" portrays a situation in which a decision is 
repeated because a sufficient number of market players have 
0invested resources in, and become reliant upon, that decision.21 
Once unforeseen, critical historical events take place, path 
dependence is observed through inertial and deterministic causal 
patterns. 211 In other words, when processes are set in motion, they 
tend to stay on the path that results. This stage has been described 
in social science literature as a state of "inertia." 212 In the legislative 
context, inertia may ensue as temporary legislation gets 
"entrapped" in a self-reinforcing sequence, making the cost of 
deviation from the renewal pattern too high. 
206 Id. at 494. 
207 See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 516 (discussing the dynamic of self-reinforcement in 
path-dependence scholarship). 
208 See William J. Aceves, InstitutionalistTheory andInternationalLegal Scholarship, 12 
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 227, 246 (1997) (discussing the role of institutions in technological 
and market changes (citing Wayne Sandholtz, Institutions and Collective Action: The New 
Telecommunicationsin Western Europe, 45 WORLD POL. 242 (1993))). 
209 Mahoney, supranote 21, at 512. 
210 See, e.g., Lim, supranote 29, at 510, 542-49 (discussing lock-in in the software industry 
where switching costs are often very high). 
211 See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 511 ("[P]ath-dependent sequences are marked by 
relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of as 'inertia'-i.e., once 
processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend 
to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome."). 
2121d. 
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Self-reinforcement creates dynamics that reproduce a specific 
pattern over time. It generates "reactive sequences" that comprise 
a chain of reaction and counterreaction as one event causally 
prompts the next, eventually leading to lock-in of the path.213 
Nevertheless, path dependence scholars recognize the possibility of 
breaking out of a lock-in situation, depending on the overall 
efficiency and strength of the inertial pattern created in the past.214 
Unexpected shocks, they claim, can alter the course of the path.215 
Political scientist Paul Pierson has identified four aspects of the 
political domain that reinforce path dependence dynamics: (1) the 
centrality of collective action, meaning that the viability of 
individual political activity depends immensely on the activities of 
others and requires positive feedback to assure their support; (2) the 
high number of organizations urging representatives to make 
commitments, which elevates the cost of departure from past 
arrangements; (3) the existence of power asymmetry, which allows 
certain actors to force others to bend to their will, making open 
political clash pointless; and (4) the complexity and cloudiness of the 
political framework. 216 Pierson also presumed that path dependence 
in politics places associations at the center of forming institutional 
patterns.217 Once adopted, institutional patterns deliver increasing 
benefits to current users because they continue to be adopted. This 
makes diverting from the selected path difficult, even if alternative 
213 See id. at 509 ("Reactive sequences are chains of temporally ordered and causally 
connected events."); see, e.g., Andrew Abbott, From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative 
Positivism, 20 Soc. METHODS & RES. 428, 445-49 (1992) (reviewing new methods for 
analyzing narrative data over time). 
214 See Roe, supra note 27, at 643-45 (describing conditions that disconnect a chain of 
events); Langer, supra note 166, at 908 & n.369 (exemplifying path dependent dynamics in 
adjudication of international criminal law). 
215 See Puffert, supra note 26, at 63 ("A process of economic allocation is called path 
dependent when the sequence of allocations depends not only on fundamental, a priori 
determinants-typically listed as technology, factor endowments, preferences, and 
institutions-but also on particular contingent events."). 
216 Pierson, supranote 27, at 257-62. 
217 See id. at 255 ("[N]ew institutions often entail high fixed or start-up costs, and they 
involve considerable learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. 
Established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability 
and further development."). 
2021] UNINTENDED LEGISLATIVE INERTIA 1231 
options exist. 218 Self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective 
action processes also mean that organizations are strongly inclined 
to remain in place once they are standardized. 219 
Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass North has drawn a 
correlation between path dependence, institutional change, and 
lock-in.220 He distinguishes between associations and institutions, 
describing institutions as "the rules of the game in a society," while 
organizations are the market players. 221 Organizations, for the most 
part, exert their influence to justify their existence and to stifle 
change.222 This is especially so when they represent one group in 
society and are committed not to the general good of all constituents 
but only to those they represent. 223 Once created, organizations are 
hard to change, and they significantly affect the path of action. 224 
Indeed, as will be demonstrated, organizations have had a large 
impact in maintaining the path dependence of temporary legislation 
in the United States through self-reinforcement dynamics that have 
resulted in increased inertia and lock-in.225 Historical investigation 
218 See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 
7 (1994) (using probability theory to show mathematically how a model of increasing returns 
works to create a path dependence sequence). 
219 See Mahoney, supranote 21, at 508 ("With increasing returns, an institutional pattern-
once adopted-delivers increasing benefits with its continued adoption, and thus over time it 
becomes more and more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously available 
options, even if these alternative options would have been more 'efficient."'); Pierson, supra 
note 27, at 258-59 ("[D]espite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-
reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes mean that organizations 
have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized."). 
2 20 See Douglass C. North, The HistoricalEvolution of Polities, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
381, 385 (1994) (describing a paradigm for long-term political and economic change). See 
generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 92-104 (1990) (considering the structure of institutions and their impact on 
the organizations that operate under them). 
221 NORTH, supranote 220, at 3-5. 
222 Id. at 5-6. 
223 Id.; see also RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE 9-11 (1982) (discussing path dependence and evolutionary economics 
processes of institutions). 
224 See NORTH, supra note 220, at 8 (noting that economic organization gradually evolve 
and alter institutional frameworks); see also Pierson, supranote 27, at 259 (arguing that self-
reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action result in organizations having a strong 
tendency to persist after they are institutionalized). 
225 See infra Part V. 
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provides a valuable tool for understanding the steps that set a path 
into motion. The following case study of a prominent fiscal policy 
will illustrate how path dynamics of expiring provisions can become 
rooted and inertial. 
IV. THE RESEARCH CREDIT AS A CASE STUDY 
The creation of the research credit program did not occur in a 
vacuum. That route began with the Cold War, which reflected a 
critical juncture-a period of worldwide technological competition, 
national security and defense anxieties, and increasing military 
concerns. 226 With the rise of Soviet scientific prowess, America 
experienced a period of self-examination in which it realized it could 
lose its technological superiority to the Communist Bloc. During 
committee hearings, the director of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) warned about the Soviet Union's growing 
scientific power: 
[T]he recent evidence of serious challenge to United 
States supremacy from the U.S.S.R. has come as a rude 
shock to most Americans and has brought about a 
period of intensely critical self-examination and 
analysis.... 
... Whether by this means [the U.S.S.R.] can 
succeed in [its] expressed ambition to dominate the 
world in scientific and technological achievement 
227 remains to be seen. 
226 For examples of scholarship studying the Cold War through the lens of critical juncture 
and path dependence, see Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical 
Junctures:Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactualsin HistoricalInstitutionalism,59 WORLD 
POL. 341, 345 & n.17 (2007) (noting that "[t]he concept of critical junctures has been applied 
to a striking variety of topics including . . . the end of the cold war"); Alen Hristov, Historical 
InstitutionalismMeets IR: ExplainingPatternsin EUDefence Spending, E-INT'L REL. (Feb. 3, 
2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/03/historical-institutionalism-meets-ir-explaining-
patterns-in-eu-defence-spending/ (arguing "that the whole early Cold War - post-Crimea 
episode is causally linked through a path dependent sequence of events"). 
227 Research and Development: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't 
Operations, 85th Cong. 5-6 (1958) [hereinafter Research and Development Hearings] 
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Achieving superiority in technology involved, among other steps, 
investment in research facilities and the education of engineers and 
scientists.228 Over a decade after the test of the first nuclear bomb 
in Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 1945, the United States undertook 
an extensive study into the nation's slowdown in scientific 
research.229 Federal sponsorship of defense-and aerospace-related 
research was low compared to that of other nations. 230 Research 
universities in the United Stated badly needed more funds directed 
toward basic research to support large-scale scientific activities. 231 
The Soviet government and its communist centralized bureaucracy 
were the main sources of industrial support for Russian research.232 
Representatives from the Congressional Committee on Science and 
Astronautics urged the U.S. government to take similar steps.2 33 
(statement of Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, NSF); see alsoid. at 2 (statement of Rep. John 
W. McCormack) (noting that the purpose of these hearings was to determine whether "our 
Federal research and development activities [were] carried on as effectively and as efficiently 
as possible" and without "wasteful duplication ... and financial bottlenecks"). 
228 See id. at 14-15 (statement of Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, NSF) (noting that the 
United States was "lag[ging] behind most other countries" in terms of commitment to and 
respect for scientific education). 
229 In 1958, the House Government Operations committee conducted an "extensive study" 
of the government's research and experimentation activities. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. John 
W. McCormack); see also id. at 315-17 (statement of Dr. John Turkevich, Eugene Higgins 
Professor of Chemistry, Princeton University) (advocating for greater federal government in 
research and education to help the United States win the "science war"). 
230 See id. at 116-17 (statement of Peter J. Schenk, President, Air Force Ass'n) (arguing 
that the United States was "spending far too little" on basic research and military research 
and development); id. at 156-58 (statement of Dr. C.C. Furnas, Chancellor of the University 
of Buffalo) (comparing the "relative status" and pace of the United States and Soviet Union 
in terms of budgetary investment and scientific output); see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 
1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (comparing military and space research expenditures of the 
United States to Japan and West Germany in the 1960s and 70s). 
231 See Research andDevelopment Hearings, supra note 227, at 160 (statement of Dr. C.C. 
Furnas, Chancellor of the University of Buffalo) ("[I]t is necessary and inevitable that major 
Federal Government support must be maintained and enlarged if this country is to keep pace 
in the world."). 
232 See id. at 311 (statement of Dr. John Turkevich, Eugene Higgins Professor of Chemistry, 
Princeton University) ("In the Soviet Union, everything is done by the Government."). They 
provided full scholarships for students and offered lower income tax rates, which contributed 
to the motivation of scientists to move to or remain in the Soviet Union. Id. at 311-13. 
233 See President's1963 Tax Message:HearingsBefore the H. Ways & Means Comm., 88th 
Cong. 2617-20 (1963) [hereinafter President's1963 Tax Message] (statement of Congressman 
1234 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1193 
Research and development became extremely important as it 
related to U.S. defense and weapon systems. 
The sluggish rate of private investment in research 
disadvantaged the U.S. trade balance with other industrialized 
nations. 234 During the 1960s and 1970s, while spending on research 
in the United States was in continuous decline, rival countries 
created a remarkable upsurge in technological research.235 Reports 
from Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
described the United States as "a state of relative decline-
politically and economically." 236 The United States was about to lose 
its standing as one of the world's most innovative countries and 
largest exporters of high-technology goods. 237 Concerns about 
economic growth and productivity became central in American 
public debate.238 Lagging productivity and sluggish investment 
Emilio Q. Daddario) (stressing the importance of research and science to create new products 
that would improve the nation's future, security, welfare, and economy). 
234 Private research to Gross National Product ratio in 1977 for the United States was 1.5%, 
compared with 1. 9 % for Japan and 2.3% for West Germany. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 
1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981); see also President's 1963 Tax Message, supranote 233, at 
2618-19 (statement of Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario) (noting that private company-
financed R&D had been greatly waning); William M. Horne, Jr., Research andDevelopment 
Expenditures (pointing to the growing "time lag" of seven years "between the research 
expenditures and their payoff in new products and whole new industries"), reprintedin H. 
COMM ON WAYS & MEANS, 85TH CONG., 2 COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX 
BASE 1115 (Comm. Print 1959). 
235 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (noting a need to reverse 
the decline in research activities in the United States relative to other countries). 
236 Tax Cut Proposals: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 96th Cong. 1326 (1980) 
[hereinafter Tax Cut ProposalsHearing] (statement of John Nesheim, Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l 
Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n) (quoting Japan's 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry). 
237 See id. at 1321 (noting that "[m]ost of America's current and future export strength 
depends upon high technology products in which semiconductors are the essential 
components" and that '[i]f America loses its technological lead in [the semiconductor] 
industry, it will impair our ability to maintain world leadership in commerce and in defense 
capability"). 
238 See, e.g., Walter W. Heller, Shying Away from Recovery, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at 
16 (explaining the debate over policy issues like tax cuts and the decisions made by the 
Federal Reserve); Christopher S. Wren, Soviet Plansto Cut Economic Lag Behind U.S. by '80, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1976, at 1 (explaining how the Soviet's plans could lead to the Soviet 
Union surpassing the United States on several economic fronts). 
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ratios led to increased calls for government involvement.239 The 
media reported a growing public fear.240 Traditional trade remedies 
were viewed as ineffective because they did not address inequalities 
in international competition.241 Industry associations urged the 
U.S. government to step out of its "neutral corner" and provide 
effective market incentives to maintain U.S. technological 
leadership. 242 Businesspersons requested that Congress help them 
compete in the "markets of the future" by investing in research, 
improved products, and more efficient production facilities.243 
239 See Bradley Graham, U.S. Productivity:GoldenDays Over, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1978, 
at F1 (reporting on a slump of U.S. productivity and noting that government agencies tasked 
with addressing the problem are ineffective); Urban C. Lehner, Manager's Journal: U.S. 
Productivity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 22 (discussing the efforts of the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor to address declining U.S. productivity). 
240 See, e.g., Edward P. Foldessy, Banking Industryin America Is FacingOnslaughtofNew 
Foreign Competition, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1978, at 4 (discussing foreign threats to the U.S. 
banking sector); James A. Rousmaniere, Jr., Senate Panel Expands Aid ProgramAimed at 
Foreign Competition, BALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 1978, at A7 (discussing fears of unemployment 
arising from foreign competition); Dan Fisher, Pressure Mounts on Steel Industry in U.S.: 
Foreign Competition, Profit Squeeze Raise Memories of 1960s Problems, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1975, at F1 (discussing fears from the steel industry concerning foreign competition). 
241 See, e.g., Richard D. Lyons, Peterson Urges Research Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1972, at 59 (discussing the need for new research and evelopment policies due to increasing 
trade imbalances in high-technology goods); Executives Urge Tax Incentives and Cut in U.S. 
Budget, but CongressmenDemur, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1974, at 3 (discussing debate among 
Congress members as to effective tax policy to address international competition); Robert W. 
Tucker, The InternationalStruggle for Power and the Question, "Does Might Make Right?", 
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1977, at A2 ("[T]he prospects for an emergent global community cannot 
appear promising today."); Brendan Jones, U.S.-JapanReport Asks FreerTrade, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 17, 1974, at 47 (discussing cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to improve 
international cooperation). 
242 See Tax Cut ProposalsHearing,supranote 236, at 1310-11 (statement of John Nesheim, 
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n) 
("[W]e face a major challenge in this decade from foreign governments ... to maintain 
America's technological leadership."); Leonard Silk, The 'Secular Slowdown' Thesis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1976, at 67 (noting the need to employ new measures to stimulate more 
research and development); Richard Foster, Letter to the Editor, Proper Support for Lagging 
R.&D., N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1979, at A22 (noting that a fundamental R&D problem is a long 
term investor behavior). 
243 President's1963 Tax Message, supra note 233, at 2601 (statement of The Fountain Pen 
& Mech. Pencil Mfrs. Ass'n); see also id. at 2690 (statement of William M. Horne, Jr., 
Chairman, Tax Policy Committee, The Manufacturing Chemists' Ass'n, Inc.) (encouraging the 
Kennedy Administration to incentivize industry to adopt new technological equipment); id. 
at 2801 (statement of Paul Robbins, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers) (same). 
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During that period, American culture began to glorify technology as 
an American ethos and as a key to achieving a competitive 
advantage. More and more people linked technological advances 
and investments in research to spurring economic growth.244 
Several routes existed to improve the U.S. position in the 
worldwide technological race. Some options included direct and 
indirect subsidies for research and development. Foreign 
governments already established subsidy models for domestic 
technological advancements. For example, during the 1960s and 
1970s, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany 
provided various tax credits and cash grants to qualifying research 
expenditures, including capital outlays for buildings and other 
assets. 245 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry implemented laws and policies that allowed U.S. firms to 
invest in Japan while negotiating patents in return.246 The 
Japanese government directly spent over $250 million on large-
scale tech programs and various incentives. 24 7 The Japanese 
government was not unique. Many other foreign governments 
244 See, e.g., Wren, supra note 238 ("The Soviet leadership ... announced production goals 
for 1977 that it hoped would help significantly narrow the Soviet Union's economic gap with 
the United States ... "); Tucker, supranote 241 (discussing international cooperation around 
modern technologies); Jones, supra note 241 (reporting on statements from economic 
development experts that investment in energy development is needed to improve growth). 
245 Such subsidies included special depreciation allowances for property devoted to R&D. 
See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1626 (statement of The Ass'n of American 
Railroads) ("[M]ajor world competitors ... provide much more favorable depreciation 
allowances than our own system of taxation. Japan, West Germany, France, Australia, and 
Canada provide capital cost allowances permitting the write-off of investments at a rate 2 to 
10 times faster than our present law."). 
246 This tactic helped Japanese companies such as Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and 
Fujitsu to sustain domestic competition. See JACK BARANSON, THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE TO 
U.S. INDUSTRY 40 (1981) (detailing the Japanese license technology approach with foreign 
companies compared to domestic competitors). 
247 See Tax Cut ProposalsHearing, supra note 236, at 1326 (statement of John Nesheim, 
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n) 
("Over the last four years the Japanese Government spent $250 million on the well publicized 
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) program."); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE 
JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975, at 16 (1982) (describing 
the way Japan imported a great proportion of its technology from the United States). 
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provided research assistance to domestic technological 
advancements that amounted up to $2 billion. 248 
Other direct stimuli paths included establishing a military 
research and development agency, similar to the Atomic Energy 
Commission, that would hire civilian and military scientists in a 
mixed organization and report to the Secretary of Defense. 249 
Proposals suggested providing incentives for private research 
2expenditures to develop defense weapons. 50 Others recommended 
stimulating investment in basic research science by providing 
incentives to corporations to collaborate with universities on 
developing basic research.251 Legislators and scholars called for not 
only reexamination of the support granted for basic and military 
research, but also for the ability to translate such research into 
economic activity and increased productivity. 252 
The growing concern for technological competitiveness and the 
emerging culture that glorified scientific innovations marked a 
critical point in time. Faced with a crossroad, decisionmakers 
needed to determine which route to adopt to keep pace with the 
worldwide technological race to the top.253 Among the indirect 
alternatives, economists called on changes to taxation to encourage 
the broadening of research efforts and more participation by both 
248 See Tax Cut Proposals Hearing, supra note 236, at 1313 (statement of John Nesheim, 
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n) 
("The Japanese, and other countries, ... are providing government support in the form of 
subsidies and tax incentives to attract the capital needed . . . . As much as two billion dollars 
is being spent on this effort ... "). 
249 See Research and Development Hearings, supra note 227, at 324 (statement of T.F. 
Walkowicz, New York City, Military Research and Development Management) (discussing 
"the proposed Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA, in the Department of Defense"). 
25O Horne, supra note 234, at 1115. 
2s1 See Tax Incentives for Exports: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Mgmt. 
of the S. Comm. on Fin., 96th Cong. 48, 50 (1979) [hereinafter Tax Incentives for Exports] 
(statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) 
(discussing a bill that would provide corporations with basic research credit). 
2s2 Destinies for American Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research & 
Prod. & the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 96th Cong. 
6, 11 (1979) [hereinafter Destinies for American Research] (statements of Rep. Donald Ritter 
and Nobel Laureate Dr. Burton Richter, Stanford Linear Accelerator, Stanford University). 
2s3 See Michael Homberg, Who Is Leading Innovation? German Computer Policies, the 
American Challenge' and the Technological Race of the 1960s and 1970s, MEDIA INACTION 
(May 26, 2017), https://www001.zimt.uni-siegen.de/ojs/index.php/mia/article/view/4/2 
(discussing the worldwide technological race to the top). 
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the private and public sector.254 Specifically on the table was the 
creation of a temporary research credit shaped after another 
temporary provision, as will be explained in the following Section. 
A. POSITIVE FEEDBACK FOR A NEW ROUTE 
Providing indirect subsidies to stimulate private investment was 
not a new idea. The United States already used tax incentives for 
similar purposes, such as immediate expensing 255 and the 
temporary "investment tax credit." 256 The research tax credit 
garnered more positive feedback than previous programs, which 
often provided lackluster benefits to constituents. As opposed to 
limited government grants, companies did not compete with each 
other for the credit as the program had no cap. Thus, the increasing 
support for the research credit amplified its advantages as more 
knowledge, experience, and involvement promoted that route. 
The National Association of Manufacturers conducted 
independent studies on the benefits of capital tax incentives for 
economic growth and encouraged the government to provide 
additional tax incentives for product development in the form of a 
new investment credit focused on research.257  While the 
254 See Gerhard Colm, The Economics of the CurrentFiscalPolicyProposalsin the United 
States, 23 PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 82, 93 (1963) (discussing tax reform measures to broaden 
research efforts and market opportunities). 
255 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 179, 174 (2018) (providing immediate expensing of capital 
expenditures in qualified property and property used for research respectively). 
256 See Stanley S. Surrey, FederalTax Policyin the 1960's, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 478 (1966) 
("The investment tax credit, designed to encourage investment through an increase in the 
rate of return on investment in machinery and equipment and also in cash flow, was 
introduced in 1961 and adopted in 1962."). Congress added § 38 to the Internal Revenue Code 
to provide a new temporary investment tax credit of seven percent of the cost of qualified 
property with at least four years of useful life. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 38, 46(a)(1), 46(c)(2) (Supp. 
IV 1958). The credit was limited to 100% of the tax liability up to $25,000, plus 25% of any 
tax liability in excess of $25,000. Id. § 46(a)(2). The credit aimed to encourage private 
investments in qualified property and to stimulate the modernization of plants and 
equipment. See Surrey, supra, at 478 (stating that the credit's purpose was to "provid[e] in 
the tax system a solid support for investment in machinery and equipment"). 
257 See generally NORMAN B. TURE, NAT'L ASS'N OF MFRS., TAX POLICY, CAPITAL 
FORMATION, AND PRODUCTIVITY: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
reprintedin GeneralTax Reform: Pub. HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d 
Cong. 178 (1973). 
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association's overreaching proposal was not enacted into law until 
almost a decade later, it planted the idea to repeat the path of 
another temporary tax program in years to come. In 1978, Senators 
John Danforth (R-MO) and William Bradley (D-NJ) proposed an 
investment credit focused on research and development designed 
after the general investment credit precursor. 258 They justified 
selecting that route by relying on studies that, at the time, predicted 
"the positive impact" of such an apparatus on research "spending, 
productivity[,] and inflation." 259 The proposed new research credit, 
they contended, would offset the ongoing reluctance of many 
companies to bear the significant costs of research.260 The new credit 
aimed to do for research investment what the investment credit 
purportedly did for capital investment-namely to reverse stagnant 
research trends.261 Yet, it took over three years for Congress to agree 
on a proper route and enact the measure because, among other 
possible options, the new research credit came with much 
uncertainty and a high price tag.262 
Treasury remained doubtful about the efficacy of yet another 
version of the investment credit for two main reasons. 26 3 First and 
foremost, a credit imposes a high burden on the U.S. budget, and it 
was not clear how Treasury could offset such an expensive tax 
expenditure. 264 Second, Treasury officials questioned utilizing the 
tax system, rather than direct government funding routes, to spur 
research investments.265 They tried to divert attention to different 
258 S. 700, 96th Cong. (1979), reprintedin Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 6. 
2g9 See Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 54 (statement of Mark Shepherd, Jr., 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Texas Instruments, Inc.) (describing a study). 
260 See id. at 53 (noting declining investments in research activity). 
261 Id. 
262 The Finance Subcommittee on Taxation estimated the revenue cost of Senate bill S. 700 
and its "10 percent investment tax credit for R&D expenditures" to be $1.872 billion in 1980, 
$2.227 billion in 1981, $2.516 billion in 1982, $2.767 billion in 1983, and almost $3 billion in 
1984. Id. at 47, 50 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for Tax Policy). 
263 See id. at 29 (describing the Treasury Department's doubts about the proposed 
investment credit). 
264 See id. at 32 ("[I]f we seek to promote investment through a special tax program, the 
offsetting revenue cost must be weighed in the balance. To realize the desired economic 
objectives, any such tax program must be consistent with continued improvement in the 
budget position"). 
265 See id. at 31-32 ("[T]he direct expenditure alternative may be more efficient."). 
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paths by calling on agencies that were more familiar with 
administering research activities, such as the NSF or the Commerce 
Department, to take on the endeavor of stimulating increased 
research efforts. 266 
Notable academics, including Nobel Laureate in Physics Dr. 
Burton Richter of Stanford University, supported using the new 
credit for research. 267 Dr. Richter stressed the importance of 
government policies that would encourage people to take more risks, 
not just in connection with capital, but also with research.268 Nobel 
Laureate Dr. Melvin Calvin also believed that providing a credit for 
research would encourage firms to innovate. 269 Representatives 
from the National Academy of Sciences also recommended this path 
and emphasized that implementing it instantaneously was critical 
because the U.S. tax structure had remained unchanged over the 
previous twenty-five years. 270 Likewise, the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science endorsed the proposed new research 
credit because it believed that it would increase returns for 
investors and the attractiveness of research investments. 271 
Representatives of nonprofit organizations such as the Midwest 
Research Institute, a large research organization that specialized in 
environmental research, raved about the bill, noting, "It is exactly 
266 See id. at 32 ("Agencies familiar with research activities such as the [NSF] or the 
Commerce Department, would have more expertise in identifying basic research than would 
the Internal Revenue Service."). 
267 See Destiniesfor American Research,supranote 252, at 70 (statement of Nobel Laureate 
Dr. Burton Richter, Stanford Linear Accelerator, Stanford University) ("Maybe you can do 
something about tax policy that lets people make a bundle more money if they innovate than 
if they go on in the present directions."). 
268 See id. ("[I]t seems to me that there clearly is a problem. It is just as advantageous in 
the short run to continue in an industry with present technology as it is to really innovate."). 
269 See id. at 71 (statement of Nobel Laureate Dr. Melvin Calvin, Chemistry Department, 
University of California, Berkeley) ("[O]ne way of perhaps inducing industry to increase its 
rate and take bigger risks is to have some tax way of providing an incentive for them."). 
270 See id. at 78 (statement of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences) 
(explaining how it was difficult to blame the lag in innovation on the tax system because it
had remained constant for twenty-five years). 
271 See WORK GRP., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING JOBS THROUGH THE SUCCESS OF 
SMALL, INNOVATIVE BUSINESSES: A REPORT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1978) (advocating for the ability of small firms to deduct the costs 
of regulatory compliance and citing to a report on the state of research), reprintedin Tax 
Incentives for Exports, supranote 251, at 122 & n.13. 
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the kind of help that the Federal Government should be providing 
to aid the economy."272 
Many businesspersons who had already gained administrative 
experience with the current format of the investment credit hoped 
to preserve its existing structure and merely expand it to include 
research expenditures. 273 While the consensus eemed to favor new 
incentives, specifically for research, business leaders kept pushing 
for utilization of the existing credit structure and expansion of its 
application to research activities. 274 Yet, as will be demonstrated 
next, the investment credit had a troublesome history that pushed 
Congress away from simply adding "research" to its existing ambit. 
Much of the backlash the investment credit route received was 
due to its unstable lifecycle. During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. 
government utilized the investment credit as part of its "New 
Economics" policy and took affirmative fiscal actions to achieve 
economic growth while responding to recurring cycles of recession 
and recovery. 275 As opposed to the neoclassical economics idea of 
free markets adjusted by an invisible hand,276 New Economics277 
272 Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 226 (statement of John McKelvey, 
President, Midwest Research Institute). 
271 See id. at 55 (statement of Mark Shepherd, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
Texas Instruments, Inc.) ("Among many proposals for financial incentives, we feel the most 
effective would be based on a change in the investment tax credit."). 
274 See id. at 40-41 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for Tax Analysis) (noting that the business community argued that "additional tax incentives 
for R. & D. would be a 'mere tinkering at the margin"'). 
275 See Eyal-Cohen, supranote 25, at 878 (detailing the historical circumstances of the birth 
and death of the investment credit). The investment credit conceptually relied on New 
Economics, Functional Finance, and Neo-Keynesian theories of government manipulation of 
market positions. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT 
INTEREST AND MONEY 175-77 (1936) (drawing a connection between increasing savings to 
more employment and advocating for a better understanding of ways to influence market 
demand); GEORGE TERBORGH, THE NEW ECONOMICS 8 (1968) (discussing the New Economics 
theory from a critical point of view); Abba P. Lerner, The Essential Propertiesof Interestand 
Money, 66 Q.J. ECON. 172, 192 (1952) (advocating the use of monetary and fiscal measures as 
an employment policy). 
276 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 48-56 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1910) (1776) (discussing the tendency of market prices 
to reach natural balance). 
277 See, e.g., Franco Modigliani, The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake 
StabilizationPolicies?, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 3 (1977) (pointing to the effect of "fiscal policy as 
the main tool to keep the economy at near full employment"). 
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and Functional Finance 278 theories relied on Neo-Keynesian 
theories of government manipulation of market positions. 279 The 
doctrines prescribed increased use of fiscal,280 monetary,281 and 
expenditure policies in a flexible manner 282 to moderate and manage 
the economy. 283 They viewed fiscal policy as a flexible tool along with 
interchangeable budget position as a form of functional 
285 calibration. 284 Focused on the potential of the economy, the 
federal budget began to include statistical calculations and 
predictions that allowed economists of the Council of Economic 
Advisors to foresee market behavior and respond to it beforehand 
via various apparatuses uch as tax policy. 286 
New Economics shifted the focus from a passive tax policy to a 
more active fiscal agenda. Using measures such as the investment 
credit, the government anticipated variable budget positions to be 
278 See Abba P. Lerner, FunctionalFinance and the FederalDebt, 10 SOC. RES. 38, 38-39 
(1943) (explaining how fiscal policy that anticipates outcomes can direct the economy). 
279 See generally KEYNES, supra note 275 (demonstrating a mathematical correlation 
between increasing savings to increased employment and market demand). 
280 See, e.g., SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, ECONOMICS OF THE KENNEDY YEARS AND A LOOK AHEAD 
88-97 (1964) (explaining the effect of increasing federal expenditures and tax incentives on 
the economy by spurring investments). 
281 See, e.g., David Meiselman, The New Economics andMonetaryPolicy, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS 
J. 95, 95-97 (1967) (discussing how increasing credit and restricting borrowing can influence 
inflation); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of PublicExpenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
387, 388 (1954) (noting the importance of government expenditure in economic calculations). 
282 See President's 1967 Tax Proposals:HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
90th Cong. 518-24 (1967) [hereinafter President's1967 Tax Proposals](statement of Joseph 
A. Pechman, Dir. of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution) (discussing flexible tax 
policy and stating that tax increases during inflation can reduce spending). 
283 See Lerner, supranote 275, at 192 (advocating the use of monetary and fiscal measures 
to control inflation and spur economic growth). 
284 See TERBORGH, supra note 275, at 8 (discussing the effect of taking certain budget 
positions as an economic stabilizer); see also Alvin H. Hansen, Inflation and the New 
Economics, CHALLENGE, Nov./Dec. 1966, at 5, 6 (discussing the correlation between monetary 
policy and fiscal policy). 
285 See Walter W. Heller, Adjusting the "New Economics" to High-Pressure Prosperity (May 
1966) (noting how New Economics utilizes the full potential of the economy), reprintedin 
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., MANAGING A FULL EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY 8, 9 (1966). 
286 See SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, J. ECON. COMM., 90TH CONG., REVENUE SHARING AND 
ITS ALTERNATIVES: WHAT FUTURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM? 1205, 1207-08 (Comm. Print 
1967) (discussing models of revenue growth and probable effects of tax policies). 
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modified as needed.287 Consequently, the U.S. government utilized 
the investment credit sporadically: suspended it in 1966, reinstated 
it in 1967, repealed it in 1969, reinstated it in 1971, increased it in 
1975, and rescinded the investment credit altogether in the tax 
reform of 1986.288 The investment credit never reappeared despite 
many proposals over the years to restore this temporary 
legislation.289 
The evaluations of the investment credit's efficacy were, at best, 
mixed.290 Many objected to the credit on account of contracyclical 
fiscal theory.291 Critics thought that this path of functional finance 
policy relied on speculative forecasts with long time lags.292 Thus, 
287 See Walter W. Heller, What's Right with Economics?, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 24 (1975) 
("[G]overnment action to stimulate supply and suppress demand at certain pressure points 
in the economy might well pass the test of economic efficiency."). 
288 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 878. 
289 Id. 
290 Some believed the investment credit was a productive economic tool that helped 
businesses obtain capital. See, e.g., Nomination of DavidA. Stockman: HearingBefore the S. 
Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong. 45 (1981) (statement of Senator John Glenn) ("I 
think it is one of our more productive economic tools, and I think [investment credits] should 
be expanded instead of criticized as leading to lower income and lower employment."). Yet, 
Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey was one of the biggest critics of temporary 
provisions, including the investment credit, and the use of the tax system to maneuver the 
market using New Economics theory. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, 
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis andIts InternationalDimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 
437, 497 n.194 (2008) (mentioning Surrey's dislike of the investment tax credit as an 
expensive and unnecessary expenditure); see also Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization: 
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on FiscalPolicy of the J. Econ. Comm., 89th Cong. 238 (1966) 
[hereinafter Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization](statement of Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (expressing skepticism regarding "the economic 
effectiveness of temporary individual income tax changes"). 
291 See Mortimer M. Caplin, Federal Tax Policy The Need for Reform, 56 GEO. L.J. 880, 
895 (1968) (noting many were not accepting of the New Economics theory); Leo J. Raskind, 
The FederalReserve System: An AdministrativeAgency for ContemporaryMonetary Policy?, 
35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299, 313 (1966) (questioning the significance of the New Economics 
theory). 
292 See President's 1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 282, at 598 (statement of Joseph A. 
Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution) (predicting a lag of six to 
twelve months for economic changes to follow fiscal action); TERBORGH, supra note 275, at 
21-22, 97 (noting that the twelve month forecast does not take into account legislative lag of 
fiscal actions); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., EconometricPolicyEvaluation:A Critique, 1 CARNEGIE-
ROCHESTER CONE. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 19, 30 (1976) (arguing that econometric estimates 
ignore the time it takes to accomplish fiscal action and various other lags affecting taxpayer's 
perception). 
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there was a buildup of public dislike of "functional finance" policy.293 
The media reported that the scope and magnitude of the chosen 
fiscal action was theoretical and subject to various biases.294 Short-
term forecasting made determining the scope of the fiscal action 
extremely uncertain. 295 In the midst of this complex account, a new 
path took an unusual turn. 
B. THE BIRTH OF A NEW TEMPORARY PATH 
There were plenty of reactive sequences and critical junctures in 
the path of the temporary investment credit. Nevertheless, its on-
and-off again history, lagging effect, and high budgetary price tag 
did not cultivate inertial forces and path dynamics that were strong 
enough to maintain its route. Rather, the investment credit was 
sought to manipulate and influence market behavior and created 
mixed public reaction.296 The investment credit was viewed as a 
failed experiment and a form of direct government intervention in 
market forces. 297 A new device disconnected enough from this 
293 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 879 ("The failure of the investment credit was greatly 
attributed to its complexity, and to a build-up of public disdain for cyclical legislation and 
fiscal activism."); Richard A. Musgrave, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of Public 
Finance, 7 J. ECON. LITERATURE 797, 798 (1969) ("When 'functional finance' reintroduced 
taxation as a policy tool, it was as an agent of deflation only, with the balanced-budget 
theorem the symbol of the both-sides approach." (citation omitted)); Richard J. Cebula, Deficit 
Spending, Expectations, and Fiscal Policy Effectiveness, 28 PUB. FIN. 362, 363 (1973) 
(discussing Lerner's "functional finance" theory and arguing that hostility towards debt 
increases may constrain effective fiscal policy). 
294 See Lucas, supra note 292, at 30 ("Insofar as this assumption is false over the sample 
period, the econometric estimates are subject to bias."); Meiselman, supra note 281, at 100 
(noting there is "essentially no tested knowledge" to be able to assess the merits of the New 
Economics' policy proposals). 
295 See Lucas, supra note 292, at 30 ("It should be clear that the forecasting 
methods . . . cannot be expected to yield even order-of-magnitude estimates of the effects of 
explicitly temporary tax adjustments."). 
296 See supranotes 287-295 and accompanying text. 
297 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 878 (describing the failed arc of the investment 
credit). Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey was one of the biggest critics of the 
investment credit and the use of the tax system to maneuver the market using New 
Economics theory. See Tax Changesfor Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 290, at 238 
(statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (criticizing the 
investment credit); Raskind, supra note 291, at 313 (questioning the significance of the New 
Economics theory). 
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unsuccessful policy experiment was needed. At this critical 
juncture, the research credit originated as an offshoot of that path. 
By the end of the 1970s, the U.S. economy was in a tailspin. 
Combined double-digit inflation and unemployment brought a peak 
in the "Misery Index."298 Hopes for a research upsurge became the 
panacea for economic recovery at that time. 299 In his State of the 
Union message, President Jimmy Carter supported extensive 
government action to encourage investments in research 
activities.300 The emerging high-tech industry-specifically the 
integrated circuits, telecommunications, and computer industries-
greatly facilitated the enactment of the research credit. American 
Electronics Association representatives strongly favored a new 
research credit as a way to stimulate long-term research growth.301 
The American Marketing Association,3 0 2  leading aerospace 
manufacturing companies,3 0 3 and the Semiconductor Industry 
Association 3 4 all recommended a similar route. 
298 See United States Misery Index: How Miserable do you Feel?, U.S. MISERY 
INDEX, http://www.miseryindex.us/indexbyyear.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (showing 
that during the 1960s, the Misery Index averaged 7.1% but rose to an average of 13.3% during 
the 1970s). 
299 The Joint Economic Committee stated: "we urge that consideration be given 
to . . . broadening investment tax credits to include private [research and development]." The 
1979 Economic Report of the President:HearingsBefore the J. Econ. Comm., 96th Cong. 22 
(1979) (report of the Williamsburg Assembly on Anti-Inflation Policy). 
300 See The State of the Union, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 105 (Jan. 23, 1979) (calling 
on Congress "to take other anti-inflation action ... to reassess our Nation's technological 
superiority"); The State of the Union, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 140 (Jan. 25, 1979) 
(emphasizing that "research and evelopment is an investment in the Nation's future"). 
301 See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1302 (statement of Herbert M. Dwight, 
American Electronics Ass'n) (recommending bills that would encourage research and 
development, including a bill providing tax credits). 
302 Tax Incentives for Research: A Public Policy Statement by the American Marketing 
Association, MARKETING NEWS, June 20, 1975, at 4 (publishing a statement of the National 
Task Force on Tax Credits and coming out in favor of a federal tax credit for research). 
303 See, e.g., Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 311-25 (statement of John F. 
McDonnell, Executive Vice President of the McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (noting that the 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation was a leading aerospace manufacturing company that 
strongly advocated for creating incentives for research and arguing that it would contribute 
to the accomplishment of important national goals). 
304 See Tax Cut Proposals,supra note 236, at 1301 (statement of John Nesheim, Corp. 
Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductors Industry Ass'n) 
(dramatizing the need for the credit stating: "We are ready to go. We have got the ideas, and 
the innovations. We need the cash flow."). 
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At that critical juncture in 1981, Congress enacted a new 
temporary research credit to stimulate private sector research and 
development.305  By applying only to incremental research 
expenditures, the credit aimed to incentivize increases in research 
and development and further expansion of research spending.306 
The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that the main reason 
for the research credit was the temporary need to reverse a decline 
in private research activities, which remained at a low, stable level 
in real terms in preceding years.30 7 But once this route was created, 
strong path dependence forces led to corresponding cycles of 
extensions. These unique conditions paved the research credit's 
unique road. Positive feedback and self-reinforcing dynamics 
created strong inertial forces that helped cement that route toward 
enactment and future renewals. Industrial associations played a 
central role in encouraging Congress to extend, expand, and 
3 08 perpetuate the research credit program. In these sequences, 
initial strides made it difficult to divert from that path. 
C. REACTIVE SEQUENCES OF RENEWALS 
Why was the research credit maintained as a temporary 
provision over so many years? Much of it was priority-driven 
inertia.309 First, the temporary label offered budgetary flexibility 
and the opportunity to look for offsetting mechanisms to the high 
305 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1982)). 
306 Under the program, firms were, and still are, allowed a dollar-for-dollar offset of income 
taxes for additional investment in research. 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 38(c), 46 
(2018) (stating how to calculate the credit). 
307 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) ("[T]he 'civilian' 
research/GNP ratio for the United States is 1.5 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for Japan 
and 2.3 percent for West Germany."). 
308 For example, small business tried to expand the new research credit route even further 
by making it refundable. See The Role of Small Business in the Nation's Economic Recovery: 
HearingBefore the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 97th Cong. 71 (1981) (statement of David 
Tonneson, Certified Public Accountant, Tonneson, Mela, Curtin & Co., Wakefield, Mass.) 
("[The Smaller Business Association of New England, Inc.] endorses a refundable tax credit 
of at least 10 percent against any incremental expenditures for research and evelopment."). 
309 See supranotes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
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fiscal price tag that came with it.310 Second, the government needed 
to evaluate the operation and efficacy of the research credit and 
assess whether it indeed stimulated additional research 
expenditures or simply rewarded firms for their everyday research 
efforts.311 Lastly, the research credit was rather complex and 
required policy expertise. 312 The periodic review gave legislators 
opportunities to appraise the credit, receive input from 
constituents, and refine the legislation. 13 Yet, the temporary 
marker incentivized legislators to "kick the can down the road" and 
simply renew this intricate fiscal mechanism rather than terminate 
or permanently add it to the U.S. Code. 
A path of reactive sequences-casually connected renewals, each 
a reaction to a temporally antecedent expiration event-ensued and 
created a legislative inertial process of multiple mechanical 
extensions. The 1981 Act set the original research credit to expire 
at the end of 1985.314 Yet, soon after, the program lapsed in 
anticipation of comprehensive reform. Congress made the first 
significant set of changes to the original credit in the 1986 reform 
(the biggest tax reform to this day), which marked another "critical 
juncture" in the history of the temporary legislation.315 The 1986 
310 See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text. 
311 See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92039, THE RESEARCH AND 
EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDIT 2-3 (1993) (discussing what led up to the Congressional action 
taken on the Research and Experimentation tax credit); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 121 
(Comm. Print 1981) (maintaining the temporariness of the credit as a way to test its 
efficiency). 
312 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 121 (Comm. Print 1981) (noting that the expiring 
nature of the law would give Congress the opportunity to assess whether taxpayers and the 
IRS were "able accurately to distinguish qualifying research expenditures from nonqualifying 
research-related expenditures"). 
313 In the case of the research credit, it allowed for periodic examination and review of 
categories of qualifying research expenditures and base period, as well as controversies 
between taxpayers and the IRS. Id.; see BRUMBAUGH, supra note 311, at 2 (discussing 
amendments to the research and experimentation tax credit). 
314 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47. For 
a detailed legislative history of the research credit, see infra Appendix. 
315 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173; see also NONNA 
A. NOTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB87010, TAX REFORM EFFECTS 2 (1987) (surveying the 
impact of the 1986 reform); Rodger A. Bolling, Surendra P. Agrawal & Thomas G. Hodge, The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification or Complication?,39 TAX EXECUTIVE 235, 239 (1987) 
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reform was portrayed as revenue-neutral as it lowered the 
individual income tax and offset it with increased revenues from the 
repeal of many business incentives.316 Surprisingly, the 1986 
Reform did not repeal the research credit but extended it 
retroactively through December 31, 1988.317 While the research 
credit survived the far-reaching 1986 Reform, its distant temporary 
relative, the investment credit, did not. The reason for abolishing 
the investment credit was neutrality.318 The investment credit 
"favored investment in machines with relatively short useful 
lives."319 Thus, it encouraged businesses to invest in equipment 
rather than other more economically efficient technologies. 
The repeal of the investment credit served as an important 
turning point for the research credit program. Technology and 
innovation assumed a central position in tax policy discourse due to 
their assumed contribution to economic development and the rise in 
the standard of living. Accordingly, it appears Congress 
acknowledged, for the first time, that the culture of research and 
experimentation was prioritized over other policies, including the 
goal of maintaining tax neutrality. The research credit portrayed 
the improved "2.0" model of the investment credit targeting a more 
direct, long-term effect on the economy. The choice not to divert 
from the research credit's initial path in the 1986 reform 
underscored the importance of maintaining a culture of 
technological innovation. Once a culture that glorified scientific 
("[T]he 1986 Act is the most sweeping tax legislation in the 73-year history of the Internal 
Revenue Code."). 
316 The main aspects of the 1986 reform included lowering income tax rates and broadening 
the tax base by eliminating or restricting deductions, exclusions, and credits. See Ajay K. 
Mehrotra & Joseph J. Thorndike, From ProgrammaticReform to Social Science Research: 
The National Tax Associationand the PromiseandPerilsof DisciplinaryEncounters, 45 LAW 
& SOC'Y REv. 593, 620-21 (2011) (describing the public atmosphere regarding the 1986 
reform). 
317 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173 (amending the 
credit through 1988). The Tax Reform made the credit part of the general business credit, 
thereby subjecting it to a yearly cap. Id. § 231, 100 Stat. at 2173. In addition, it lowered the 
credit to 20% and modified the definition of qualified research expenses. Id. The 1986 reform 
also created a separate 20% incremental tax credit for corporate expenditures to support basic 
research payments to universities and non-profit organizations. Id. § 231, 100 Stat. at 2175. 
318 See NOTO, supranote 315, at 5 ("A major reason the investment credit was repealed was 
to eliminate its distortions of investment choices."). 
319 Id 
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research was established, corresponding industrial associations 
self-reinforced the path of the research credit program, as the next 
Part demonstrates. 
V. SELF-REINFORCED INERTIA 
The research credit was extended for one more year by the 
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.320 A year later, 
the research credit was further prolonged in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, which also made the research credit 
more accessible for start-up firms.321 Congress routinely continued 
the research credit's temporary inertial route using extensions and 
renewals. 322 As this Part will reveal, these reactive sequences 
became locked-in and resistant to change through the efforts of 
organizations and associations that self-reinforced the program's 
expansion. The wide support given to the research credit prior to its 
creation did not dwindle but grew and encompassed additional 
supporters as its path expanded. New coalitions encouraged shifting 
government funds to commercialize science and technology. 323 
Organizations delivered positive feedback via collective action and 
strong rhetoric to encourage more participants to utilize the 
program. The research credit's path perpetuated itself with the 
utmost inertial strength. 
Accordingly, over the years, the research credit received 
bipartisan support in spite of its high budgetary price tag.324 While 
320 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4007, 102 Stat. 
3342, 3652. In addition, it curtailed the benefit to firms by obligating them to reduce their 
expensing claimed under § 174 by fifty percent of the combined amount of the credits. See id. 
at § 1002(h)(1), 102 Stat. at 3370. 
321 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7110(a)(1)-(c)(3), 103 Stat. 2106, 2322-23 (extending the research 
credit from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990 and providing a special provision for start-
ups). 
322 See infra Appendix. 
323 See Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, The Emergence of a Competitiveness Research 
and Development Policy Coalition and the Commercialization of Academic Science and 
Technology, 21 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 303, 304 (1996) (comparing the historical support 
for research granted by the defense and health coalitions). 
324 See Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 880 -
American Research and Competitiveness Act of 2015 (May 19, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr880r_ 
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both political parties supported extending the credit, disagreement 
between Republicans and Democrats arose often over whether and 
how to offset the revenue cost of this expensive measure. 325 No party 
dared to repeal a popular apparatus to support "white-coats" 
engaged in scientific advancements that drive future economic 
growth. 326 Technology and innovation, by that time, were deeply 
embedded values in the American culture. Self-reinforcement 
dynamics of coalitions, professional organizations, and industrial 
associations engaged in paving the path for the research credit and, 
once it was created, molded it over the years toward permanency. 327 
While such overreaching inertial forces existed in the case of the 
research credit, they did not in circumstances surrounding other 
temporary legislation, such as the late investment credit.328 
A. NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 
In 1993, the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI), a non-partisan 
public policy research organization dedicated to assuring minimal 
market distortions, 329 reported to the President that government-
spending priorities should focus on providing more incentives for 
private investment in research. 330 ESI also reiterated the 
20150519.pdf (rejecting a permanent extension unless the cost will be offset with other 
revenue measures). 
325 See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH AND 
EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12-
14 (2008) (describing how Republican leadership retroactively extended the research credit 
and certain other preferences through 2009). 
326 See Martin A. Sullivan, Research Credit Hits New Heights, No End in Sight, 94 TAX 
NOTES 801, 801-03 (2002) (describing the fluctuating regulations on the research credit over 
time, and specifically, the shift between the Clinton Administration's regulations and the 
Bush Administration's regulations). 
327 See id. at 802 (describing the involvement of businesses in advocating for specific 
changes in the research credit's regulation with Congress and executives both during the 
Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration). 
328 For a short list of temporary legislation that did not survive, see supranote 17. 
329 See Who We Are, ECON. STRATEGY INST., https://www.econstrat.org/about-us/who-we-
are (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) ("[ESI] is a private, non-profit, non-partisan public policy 
research organization dedicated to assuring that globalization works with market forces to 
achieve maximum benefits rather than distorting markets, and imposing costs."). 
330 See The 1993 Economic Report of the President:HearingsBefore the J. Econ. Comm., 
103d Cong. 17 (1993) [hereinafter The 1993 Economic Report of the President] (statement of 
Lawrence Chimerine, Senior Economic Counselor, DRI/McGraw Hill and Fellow, Economic 
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importance of encouraging more public-private partnerships to fund 
research collaboration in government-owned facilities. 33 1 The 
Committee for Economic Development (CED)-a non-partisan, 
business-led, public policy organization-prioritized federal 
spending programs during the 1990s. 332 While scrutinizing other 
programs, CED reaffirmed the research credit, citing studies 
showing that technology is a major source of improved living 
standards. 333 The CED acknowledged that civilian research 
expenditures, as a percent of GNP, had been quite weak during the 
last decade. 334 It advocated using the federal deficit to reverse the 
low savings rate via the research credit program. 335 Steven A. 
Zimmer, a senior economist at the N.Y. Federal Reserve Bank, 
discussed the cost of technology capital before the House 
Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness in 1992.336 
Zimmer recounted that firms were disadvantaged when investing 
in research projects, which tend to have a higher cost of capital. 337 
Thus, in his eyes, a research credit program was important to 
eliminate most of such hindrances. 338 
Indeed, the periodic expiration of the research credit provided 
opportunities for government and industry to question and 
Strategy Institute) ("R&D ... means providing more incentives for private investment 
through more tax credits .... "). 
331 See id. at 50 ("Combined public-private investment initiatives could also provide an 
immediate boost to the economy."). 
332 See Investment Incentives and Capital Costs:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Tech. & 
Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 102d Cong. 25 (1992) [hereinafter 
Investment Incentives andCapitalCosts] (statement of William Beeman, Vice President and 
Director of Economic Studies, Committee for Economic Development) (describing the 
priorities of the CED). 
333 See id. at 21, 25 (opposing "fiscal stimulus" but stating that "[i]nadequate investment in 
productive physical capital, education and training, and scientific research and technology 
have been major contributing factors to the slowdown in the growth of productivity"). 
334 See id. at 25 (discussing the reasons for "unsatisfactory" economic performance). 
335 See id. at 29 (stating that, among other programs, 'CED has placed the highest priority 
on . . . [m]easures that encourage research and evelopment"). 
336 d. at 69 (statement of Steven A. Zimmer, Senior Manager, Warburg Investment 
Management International). 
337 See id. at 71 (noting that smaller firms "have a tough time supporting the fixed cost of 
something like research and development spending"). 
338 See id. at 72 (claiming that the cost of capital for research and development can be 
reduced with an effective tax credit of twenty percent). 
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reexamine the program's efficacy. 339 Was the research credit indeed 
effective in spurring investments in research that otherwise would 
not have occurred? Throughout the years, those in favor, and the 
few that criticized the research credit, used various empirical 
studies regarding the credit's effectiveness. 340 For example, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office published a study concluding that the 
credit positively increased research spending. 34 1 The NSF followed 
suit, emphasizing the beneficial patterns of amplified research 
expenditures in government, civilian, and university sources since 
the enactment of the research credit program. 342 Yet, the 
339 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE 
RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 3 (1989) 
(concluding that the research credit economically justifies its cost); Martin A. Sullivan, The 
Research Credit:A PerfectExample of anImperfect Code, 85 TAX NOTES 128, 130 (1999) (citing 
to a list of economists that claim to prove the research credit's efficiency); Philip G. Berger, 
Explicit and Implicit Tax Effects of the R&D Tax Credit, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 131, 167 (1993) 
(finding that the research credit incentivized additional spending above its cost to the 
government); Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith & John Van Reenen, Do R&D Tax Credits Work? 
Evidence from a Panelof Countries1979-1997, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (2002) (finding that the 
research credit is effective in increasing R&D intensity); Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the 
R&E Tax Credit to DriveInnovation, Competitiveness and Prosperity,32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 
617, 619 (2007) ("[A]lmost all scholarly studies ... have found that the credit is an effective 
tool and that at minimum it produces at least one dollar of research for every tax dollar 
forgone."); BRONWYN H. HALL, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX 
CREDITS: CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN 24 (1995), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH95%200TArtax.pdf (arguing that the research 
credits induce R&D that covers their cost); see also Emily Chasan, CFOs Warn Investors on 
Impact of Expired R&D Tax Credit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CFOB-5087 (reporting that the temporary credit had a 
positive effect on the firm's earnings); Joe Harpaz, R&D Tax CreditExpiry RearsIts Head in 
Corporate Earnings Reports, FORBES (May 1, 2014, 1:39 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/05/01/rd-tax-credit-expiry-rears-its-head-in-
corporate-earnings-reports/?sh=4f836e0f5716 (same). But see Robert Eisner, Steven H. Albert 
& Martin A. Sullivan, The New Incremental Tax Creditfor R&D: Incentive or Disincentive?, 
37 NAT'L TAX J. 171, 181 (1984) (finding no "positive impact" between the research credit and 
R&D expenditures). 
340 See supranote 339. 
341 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE 
RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 3 (1989) 
("[E]ach dollar of taxes foregone stimulated between 15 and 36 cents of research spending."). 
342 See National Patterns of R&D Resources: 1994, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., 
https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20150629163238/http://www.nsf. gov/statistics/s2194/hig 
hlig3.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (quantifying R&D spending in each sector). The NSF 
reported that after a long-time stagnation in research expenditures during the 1970s, the 
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) challenged the credit's 
effectiveness. 343 CRS staff economists doubted whether the program 
was the best way to support research: they believed that direct 
funding of research projects could be more cost-effective than the 
research credit itself.344 Moreover, research conducted by firms 
whose research expenditures were shrinking, and were not entitled 
to claim the credit, might have been equally valuable to firms that 
were eligible to utilize it.345 The CRS maintained that the non-
refundability of the credit restricted its effect to large, established 
firms with positive tax liabilities, viewing the multiplicity of 
benefits for research as unwarranted. 346 
With the commencement of a new century, the growth of e-
commerce continued to cultivate the status of scientific 
advancements and global technological competitiveness. 347 This 
culture was imperative in cementing the inertial path of the 
research credit. Representatives across the political spectrum 
emphasized the importance of maintaining the U.S. position in 
1980s marked a significant increase in industry research expenditures. National Patternsof 
R&D Resources: 1994, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/201506281655 
18/http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/s2194/conten1.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). In ten years, 
private research outlays in 1990 doubled from their 1980 level. National Patternsof R&D 
Resources: 1994, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20150629163247/ 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/s2194/contenlb.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
343 See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-273 E, TAx PROVISIONS EXPIRING 
IN 1992, at 3 (1992) (arguing that "a tax credit may not be the best way" for the government 
to support research). 
344 See id. ("Some have argued that direct funding of research projects may be more cost 
effective than the R&E credit."). 
345 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 20 (finding that the research credit "was most 
beneficial to firms whose research intensities had grown since their base periods and least 
beneficial to firms whose research intensities had changed little, not at all, or shrunk since 
their base periods"). 
346 Firms were already permitted to use immediate expensing of their research outlays in 
the same year those expenses were incurred. Id. at 7. 
347 See generally Henry Kissinger, Making a Go of Globalization:ForFree Trade to Work, 
Political Imagination Must Match Economic Growth, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1999, at A33 
(discussing how to attain economic growth in a time of growing globalization); Ann Scott 
Tyson, Should World Wide Web Be a Tax-Free Zone?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 28, 
2000), https://www.csmonitor.com/2000/0228/p3s1.html (quoting e-commerce advocates 
claiming that a ban on Internet taxes is critical for growth). 
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international competition. 348 Policymakers from both parties 
believed technology would enable the United States to compete in 
the future global market. 349 This ethos facilitated a bipartisan 
agreement that maintaining the research credit program was 
essential.350 For example, by the start of a new millennium, House 
Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-
MO), Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), Minority Leader 
Tom Daschle (D-SD), Vice President Al Gore (D), and Governor 
George W. Bush (R-TX) all endorsed continuing the research credit 
and expanding its scope.351 The Joint Committee on Taxation 
routinely supported extending the research credit program for its 
purported benefits in reversing declining research trends.352 The 
Joint Committee even went as far as encouraging legislators to 
make the research credit program permanent in order to increase 
certainty for firms currently utilizing it.A35 
348 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, White House andSenate in TradeAccord, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 
2002, at A30 (discussing Democrats' proposal to provide health insurance subsidies for 
workers who lost jobs because of international competition); Sander Levin, Derailing a 
Consensus on Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A29 (reporting a House Republican 
leadership initiative on a trade bill that handled international trade standards). 
s49 See Anne Swardson, A Better Blend of TransatlanticCompetition, WASH. POST, July 2, 
2000, at B1 (discussing the EU and U.S. relationship over technological disputes); Bob Davis 
& Gerald F. Seib, Technology Will Test a Washington Culture Born in IndustrialAge, WALL 
ST. J., May 1, 2000, at Al (citing the President's agenda under the New Economy policy to 
break concentration of technological power); Bill Joy, Technology Check, WASH. POST, Apr. 
18, 2000, at A29 (suggesting policies to handle rapidly accelerating technological progress). 
sso See Investment Incentives and CapitalCosts, supranote 332, at 115 (statement of Peter 
Friedman, President, Photonics Imaging, Inc., representing the American Electronics 
Association) ("In a business environment where R&D cycles are calculated in years, and 
products lives are calculated in months, a permanent [Research and Development Tax Credit] 
is essential."). 
351 See The Tax Code and the New Economy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 101 (2000) [hereinafter The Tax Code and the 
New Economy] (statement of R. Randall Capps, Corporate Tax Director, and General Tax 
Counsel, Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Plano, Texas) (noting that these politicians 
"have all endorsed the permanent R&D credit"). 
352 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 114-22 
(Comm. Print 1999) (advocating for the extension of the research tax credit to encourage 
incremental research projects with increased long-term financial risk). 
353 See id. at 123 ("A credit of longer duration may more successfully induce additional 
research than would a temporary credit, even if the temporary credit is periodically 
renewed."). 
2021] UNINTENDED LEGISLATIVE INERTIA 1255 
B. INDUSTRY LEADERS AND PROFESSIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATIONS 
Over the years, the path of the research credit became more 
stable and harder to divert.354 Industry leaders and professional 
organizations played a key role in sustaining increasing returns and 
positive feedback dynamics for repeated extensions of the research 
credit program. 355 Their member firms came to rely on the research 
subsidy, and as more firms utilized the program, its path 
entrenched and expanded. These organizations used three main 
justifications for the need to make the research credit permanent: 
First, the temporary nature of the program increased its 
uncertainty and made relying on it difficult because projects were 
multi-year commitments. 356 Managers and decisionmakers needed 
assurance that the credit would be available during the upcoming 
years as the research would continue. 357 Second, due to their long-
term nature, research projects have stretched schedules that 
develop over several years. Accordingly, firms faced long lags in 
harvesting returns on their research investments compared to 
ordinary investments in capital; they demanded stability rather 
than the practice of periodically extending the credit for short 
periods or allowing it to lapse. 358 Lastly, assuring the research credit 
would be available past administrative audit was a big hurdle. The 
364 See NORTH, supra note 220, at 100 (describing the interaction between organizations 
and institutions (rules and procedures)). 
365 See, e.g., Peter Passell, The Tax Creditfor Research andDevelopment: FreeLunch, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at D2 ("[T]he academy is solidly behind the tax credit for research and 
development because it offsets what is widely viewed as the systemic failure of free markets 
to allocate adequate resources to research and development. Study after study has found that 
corporations capture only about half of the gain from in-house innovation, with the rest going 
to other businesses or to consumers."); John Markoff, U.S. Planningto Extend Tax Creditfor 
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A21 ("While economists have said that the effects of 
the tax credit have been diminished because the yearly extensions have made it difficult for 
companies to plan, studies have shown that the credit does have a significant effect on the 
economy."). 
356 See supranote 353. 
357 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 122-23 
(Comm. Print 1999) ("If a taxpayer considers an incremental research project, the lack of 
certainty regarding the availability of future credits increases the financial risk of the 
expenditure."). 
358 See supranote 350. 
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credit's temporary nature and transitionary rules increased its 
(already high) complexity and its surrounding controversy.3 59 Thus, 
managers sought to resolve these major issues while Congress 
considered making the credit permanent. 
Newspaper articles reinforced these points by noting the 
uncertainty and shortage in long-term capital investments in 
research.360 Congress needed to redesign research incentives to spur 
savings over consumption and provide productive investment over 
speculation.3 6 i Fortune Magazine published a cover article that 
compared the competitiveness of firms in thirteen key industries in 
the United States, Japan, and Europe.36 2 The United States was 
ranked last in electronics.363 
The government justified continuing research subsidies under 
the claim that the market fails to allocate resources for research 
efficiently.36 4 This was said to cause the level of private spending on 
research to fall short of the amount that is warranted by the social 
benefits of research.365 Patents that protect developers' investments 
359 See Passell, supranote 355 ("The ... uncertainty has made it harder for companies to 
forecast their costs, net of credits, on long-term research projects. And while the impact on 
private research budges is unclear, uncertainty has probably cut outlays."). 
360 See, e.g., supranotes 238-241, 355, 359 and accompanying text. 
361 See Executives Urge Tax Incentives and Cut in U.S. Budget, but Congressmen Demur, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1974, at 3 (describing a potential tax imposed on profits "unless a 
concern diverts profits to research and evelopment or capital spending projects"). 
362 Andrew Kupfer & Jessica Skelly von Brachel, How American Industry Stacks Up, 
FORTUNE, Mar. 9, 1992, at 30. 
363 See id. (describing the U.S. consumer electronics industry as sinking "[l]ike a rock"). 
364 See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR R&D AND INNOVATION xi (1984) 
("[T]he government seeks to foster innovation by establishing conditions conducive to 
innovative activity, . . .R&D provides the scientific and technical advances needed to sustain 
rapid rates of innovation."); id. at 10 ("The ... argument favoring governmental funding of 
R&D is based on the alleged inadequacy of the R&D carried out by the private sector, mainly 
because private businesses are generally unable to retain all the economic benefits of the 
R&D that they fund."); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND 
ADMINISTRATION: THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
SPENDING 2 (1989) ("Lawmakers wanted to provide an incentive for businesses to invest in 
research because they were concerned about the competitiveness of American firms."). 
365 The reason given for such market shortage was that some types of research required 
immense sums of capital, were too uncertain, or were difficult to evaluate accurately due to 
lack of information or expertise. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 343, at 3 ("[W]ithout 
government support private industry invests less in research than is warranted by society's 
needs."). 
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in knowledge ultimately expire, and others reproduce the invention 
and appropriate part of its return.366 Accordingly, the total return 
to society from research is often greater than the return that accrues 
to the firm that originated the investment in research.36 7 This form 
of market failure for innovations was said to preclude firms from 
undertaking research even though it is warranted by its immense 
return to society.36 8 
The Semiconductor Industry Association was particularly 
conducive in endorsing renewals of the research credit. While doing 
so, it self-reinforced its own existence by encouraging more 
participation in the program and preserving important benefits to 
its members.369 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's high-
technology sector continued to pose the greatest competitive 
challenge to the telecommunications and computer industries. 370 To 
ass See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75 
TEx. L. REV. 989, 991 (1997) (providing an overview of the relationship "between the rights of 
original developers and the rights of subsequent improvers"); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Un-
Unified Economic Theories of Patents The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
267, 273-85 (1996) (discussing the various theories on how patent rights serve as incentives 
for innovative activity). 
367 See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 343, at 3 (explaining that markets "may not function 
optimally in the case of research"). On the uncertainty that is involved in innovation, see 
Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 978-81 (2016). 
368 See BRUMBAUGH, supranote 343, at 3 ("[W]ithout government support private industry 
invests less in research than is warranted by society's needs. The shortfall can be important. 
The advances in technology spawned by R&D can result in increased productivity-a leading 
source of gains in the Nation's standard of living."); see alsoU.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra 
note 364, at xi ("The substantial government subsidies provided for research and development 
are justified on the grounds that the government should support R&D projects that are 
socially desirable but that are unlikely to be funded by private firms."); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., 
GGD-89-114, TAx POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED 
SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 22 (1989) ("R&E expenditures may generate benefits 
to society beyond those realized by companies that make these expenditures. If the activities 
encouraged by the credit are more beneficial to society than the activities discouraged by the 
additional taxes needed to fund the credit, then the credit is acceptable tax policy."). 
369 See Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 202 (statement of John Nesheim, 
Treasurer, National Semiconductor Corp., Santa Clara, Calif.) ("New products, new 
technological innovations and, indeed, whole new industries might well be created as a result 
of increased research. . . . [P]roviding an investment tax credit for R. & D. expenditures will 
help to make available to U.S. businesses some of the capital which will enable the businesses 
to modernize and maintain our all-important technology lead."). 
370 Structural differences between the countries' economic environments provided Japan 
significant export competitive advantages over the United States and other nations. See U.S.-
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survive, semiconductor companies had to innovate and invest in 
high levels of research and development. 371 Yet, such investments, 
the Association noted, were highly uncertain, while new facilities 
quickly became obsolete. 372 Self-funding was the industry's main 
problem. Three quarters of American tech companies' new capital 
at that time came from the reinvestment of after-tax earnings. 373 
Most companies paid "little or no dividends." 374 They sought tax 
reductions to generate new capital to reinvest in new technology 
rather than to transfer to investors. 375 Such testimonies and 
statements were instrumental in reinforcing the research credit's 
path. Congressional representatives acknowledged the challenges 
of the semiconductor industry and committed to advocate for 
government support of technological research. 376 
Consequently, the inertial path of the research credit persisted 
vigorously into its second decade of its existence. Congress extended 
the research credit in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990377 and the Tax Extension Act of 1991.378 Delegates from the 
American Electronics Association (AEA)-a trade association 
JapaneseEconomicRelations:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, Fin., & Security 
Econ. of the J. Econ. Comm., 97th Cong. 81-82 (1981) [hereinafter U.S.-JapaneseEconomic 
Relations] (statement of George Scalise, Senior Vice President, Advanced Micro Devices Inc., 
in Sunnyvale, Calif.) ("[T]hese structural differences constitute the greatest threat to long-
term viability of the U.S. industry."). 
371 See Tax Cut Proposals,supra note 236, at 1324 (statement of John Nesheim, Corp. 
Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductors Industry Ass'n) ("In 
order to survive, a semiconductor company must innovate and invest for the future. The 
industry must support very high levels of research and development."). 
372 See id. at 1324 ("[T]he new facilities will be obsolete in just a few years."). 
37 Id. at 1332. 
374d. 
37 See id. ("If Congress would provide us the kinds of incentives through the tax system 
that other countries provide ... , we would overcome much of our growing competitive 
disadvantages as we seek to retain the U.S. lead in semiconductor technology. More needs to 
be done-especially in capital formation and trade policy-and tax reform is needed promptly 
in this aggressive, fast moving industry."). 
376 See, e.g., U.S.-JapaneseEconomic Relations, supra note 370, at 81 (statement of Rep. 
Frederick W. Richmond) ("I ... would like to do everything that we possibly can to help keep 
the semiconductor business here in the United States. After all, we invented it; didn't we?"). 
37 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11402 (a), 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-473 (extending the research credit for one more year). 
378 Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 102(a), 105 Stat. 1686, 1686 
(extending the research credit for six more months). 
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founded in 1943 to represent the technology industry, including 
firms like IBM, AT&T, Motorola, and others-testified before the 
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. 379 The AEA 
delegates reinforced the Association's own existence by claiming 
that high-technology companies were being hindered by the short-
term mentality of investors when these companies required long-
term capital investments, especially those involving research.380 
The great uncertainty surrounding long-term research investments 
made it virtually impossible to raise large sums of capital. 381 The 
AEA went on to fault the United States for being "the only country 
that does not protect industries which have some strategic value." 382 
Three months before its scheduled expiration, the AEA urged 
Congress not only to continue the research credit's path but to 
expand it. It advocated for the adoption of a permanent and more 
aggressive research credit program to prevent American companies 
from moving research overseas. 383 
Yet, some managers, such as Hewlett Packard, admitted that 
they considered the research credit so unusable that they no longer 
calculated it into their long-range cost analyses. 384 Similarly, 
industry leader George Hatsopoulos-chairman of Thermo-Electron 
(today Thermo-Fisher Scientific)-confessed that, for his firm, the 
effect of the research credit was like a drop in the sea.385 While he 
appreciated the extra tax savings, he admitted the credit really did 
379 See Investment Incentiues and Capital Costs, supra note 332, at 102-17 (statement of 
Peter Friedman, President, Photonics Imaging, Inc.) (testifying on behalf of the AEA). 
380 See id. at 112 ("Instead of being challenged on how we can bring our R&D to the 
marketplace, we are being dismissed by Wall Street . . . because we cannot promise returns 
before the next quarterly statement."). 
381 See id. (explaining that, for high-tech companies, "it is virtually impossible to raise 
money on Wall Street" due to investors' "short-term mentality"). 
382 Id. at 103. 
383 See id. at 113 ("[T]he AEA ... strongly supports tax policies that encourage investment 
in R&D and manufacturing."). The AEA advocated for a fifty-percent credit, claiming such an 
increase was necessary to ensure the program's effectiveness. Id. 
384 See Rick Wartzman, Whether or Not They Benefit, Companies Decry Instability in Tax 
Law as aBarrierto Planning,WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A16 (citing managers responding 
to the extension of the research credit). 
381 See Investment Incentiues and CapitalCosts, supra note 332, at 71 (statement of Steven 
A. Zimmer, Senior Manager, Warburg Investment Management Int'l) (stating that he met 
with Mr. Hatsopoulos and recorded his reaction). 
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not "enter into [the firm's] marginal decision to invest at all."386 The 
reasons for that were twofold: First, the credit's small size made it 
less relevant to company executives. 387 Second, the credit involved 
much uncertainty as a temporary provision.388 Even if a firm 
claimed the credit in one year and included it as a base year for the 
future, it could harm the firm in the long run. Therefore, some firms' 
decisionmakers disregarded the research credit. Hatsopoulos 
proposed to alter the path and provide a five percent credit on total 
research spending, which would have far more impact than the 
existing incremental twenty percent research credit. 389 He also 
supported a refundable research credit.390 These proposals did not 
gain traction.39 1 
During the 1990s, the research credit continued its inertial path 
despite its high fiscal price and severe budgetary pressures during 
that period.39 2 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush vetoed a bill 
that included an extension of the research credit for reasons that 
had nothing to do with the credit.393 President Bush proposed an 
386 Id. 
387 Id. 
388 See id. at 71 ("[He] was worried if he brought it up this year, this year might be included 
as a base year for the future and it could hurt them in the long run."); id. at 76 ("Managers 
can't be sure how the rules are going to be changed, and additional R&D spending now could 
reduce eligibility for credits later."). 
389 See id. at 71 (stating that Hatsopoulos said, "[A] 5 percent tax credit on total research 
and development spending would have far more impact than an incremental 20 percent 
credit"). 
390 See id. ("Hatsopoulous said that they appreciate any research and development tax 
credit ... "). 
391 See Jonathan Talley, Note, The Research and Development Tax Credit: Moderately 
Effective but Hamperedby Politics, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 77, 80 (2011) ("[N]o Congress 
and President have been able to agree on a permanent extension due to the difficulty of 
reconciling the revenue cost of a permanent extension with other budget priorities."); 
Wartzman, supra note 384 (citing managers' responses to the extension of the research 
credit). 
392 See Talley, supra note 391, at 79-80 (discussing Congress's trend in the 1990s of 
continuously extending the research credit only on yearly bases because of "the difficulty of 
reconciling the revenue cost of a permanent extension with other budget priorities"). 
393 See GEORGE BUSH, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING HIS VETO OF H.R. 4210, THE "TAx FAIRNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
ACCELERATION ACT OF 1992," H.R. DOC. NO. 102-206, at 1 (1992) (relaying presidential veto 
of the Act because it would increase taxes for "[m]ore than two-thirds of all taxpayers"); see 
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economic growth program but claimed that Congress had "produced 
partisan, flawed legislation" that would not create incentives for 
long-term investment and would increase income taxes for more 
than two-thirds of taxpayers. 394 As a result, the research credit 
expired on June 30, 1992, and lapsed for the first time, underlining 
its temporary nature. But it did not lapse for long. Once the political 
crisis was negotiated, so were the terms of the program extension, 
and the research credit was retroactively reinstated through June 
30, 1995.395 Retroactive renewals are extreme statutory measures, 
and their repeated practice in the case of the research credit 
emphasizes the ultimate inertial forces that fueled it.396 
In his initiative titled "Rebuild America," President Clinton 
made it clear that he prioritized support for the high-tech sector by 
including an investment program of $17 billion devoted partly to 
technology funding for the NSF but mostly to the extension of the 
research credit program.39 7 President Clinton also put forth a 
proposal to bring back the late investment credit again in the form 
of a temporary program.398 During 1993, the Joint Economic 
Committee reported another decline in research investments in the 
United States.399 It warned about a widening gap between U.S. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCELERATION ACT OF 1992, H.R. REP. NO. 102-432, at 29 (1992) 
(proposing a permanent extension of the research credit). 
394 GEORGE BUSH, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING 
HIS VETO OF H.R. 4210, THE "TAX FAIRNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCELERATION ACT OF 
1992," H.R. DOC. NO. 102-206, at 1 (1992). 
395 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204, 110 Stat. 1755, 
1773. 
a96 See Kysar, supranote 138, at 1065 ("[R]etroactive renewals create heavy administrative 
costs to taxpayers and may even jeopardize financing arrangements."). 
397 See The 1993 Economic Reportof the President,supranote 330, at 133 (statement of the 
Hon. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers) (describing the Rebuild 
America initiative, including the funding for "the [NSF], science, engineering, and technology 
grants, ... and extension of the research and evelopment ax credit"). 
398 See id. at 131 (proposing the tax credit last for approximately two years). The proposal 
was meant for businesses with "over $5 million in gross receipts ... on all equipment 
investment above 70% of a historical base (a three-year average)." Id. President Clinton 
proposed a simpler version of that credit for small business. See Sullivan, supranote 339, at 
128 (describing "the proposed $10.5 billion extension of the research credit"). 
a99 See The 1993 Economic Report of the President, supra note 330, at 5-7 (statement of 
Rep. David R. Obey, Chairman, J. Econ. Comm.) (illustrating a decline in public and private 
research investment in the United States). 
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research outlays compared to the West Germans and Japanese.400 
The enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
(1993 Act) was a response to such concerns, resulting in extending 
the research credit retroactively once more until June 30, 1995.401 
President Clinton's proposal for the 1993 Act was to make the credit 
permanent.4 2 The House approved and passed the proposal, but the 
Senate version of the 1993 Act contained only an extension.403 
According to scholars, this was a result of political struggle over the 
Republican campaign pledge to create a balanced budget.404 
Notwithstanding its irregular extension cycles and, at times, its 
utility as a political negotiating tool, the credit's inertial path 
steadily continued to build due to its increasing return and positive 
feedback dynamics as more companies used it and called for its 
permanence. 
Congressional delay caused the research credit to expire again 
on June 30, 1995. Although small mom-and-pop shops did not use 
the program as often as large high-technology firms, Congress 
placed the next extension of the research credit in the Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996.405 The Act extended the credit 
and retroactively reinstated it but only from July 1, 1996, leaving 
the first and last one-year gap in the credit's operation since its 
inception in 1981. This was a critical juncture that could have ended 
the path of the research credit. Yet, the inertial forces that 
maintained the credit since its inception continued its route 
forward. The reactive sequences of the research credit returned, and 
although the credit expired in 1997 and 1998, it was extended 
400 Id. at 7. 
401 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111(a)(1), 107 Stat. 
312, 420 (extending the research credit from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1995). 
402 See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 311, at 4 ("President Clinton's budget proposals that were 
announced in 1993 proposed to make the R&E credit permanent."). 
403 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111(a)(1), 107 Stat. 
312, 420. 
404 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the ErodingBudget Process, 81 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 61, 65 (2018) (describing the political circumstances around the enactment of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). 
405 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204(a), 110 Stat. 
1755, 1773 (extending the research credit from July 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997). 
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retroactively once again by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997406 and 
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1998.407 The legislative packages in which 
Congress placed the program serve as evidence of the status quo 
bias and the length to which legislators went o extend the research 
credit's inertial path rather than to let it die. Once more, the credit 
expired in 1999 because of coalition-related priorities and political 
divide. It was retroactively reinstated and extended until 2004 in 
the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, 
which Republicans advanced.408 That year, Congress emphasized 
09 extending expiring provisions, such as the research credit, 4 and 
commentators at that time opined that this political push for the 
five-year extension of the research credit was meant to provide 
businesspersons certainty. 410 
During the years that the credit was due to expire, Congress 
introduced a dozen bills to permanently extend the credit.411 These 
cycles and reactive sequences began with organizations, economists, 
and supporters of the credit emphasizing the importance of 
technological innovation to the economy.412 Presidential candidates 
406 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 601(a)(1), 111 Stat. 788, 861 
(extending the research credit from May 31, 1997 to June 30, 1998). 
40 7 Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1001(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-888 
(extending the research credit from June 30, 1998 to June 30, 1999). 
408 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
§ 502(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1860, 1919 (extending the credit from June 30, 1999 to June 30, 2004); 
see Sullivan, supranote 339, at 128 (briefly discussing the political economy of 1999 around 
the research credit and arguing that the extension of the research credit was closer to a "sure 
bet" than other options). 
409 See, e.g., H.R. 2923, 106th Cong. §§ 101-05 (1999) (providing for a five-year extension of 
research credits). 
410 See, e.g., John M. Bixler & Ronald D. Aucutt, WashingtonReport, 25 ACTEC NOTES 190, 
190 (1999) (describing the "ironies of the 1999 long-term extension of the research credit and 
other expiring provisions"); Ryan J. Donmoyer, U.S. Senate Finance Committee Preparesto 
Mark Up Extended Extenders Bill, TAx NOTES TODAY (Oct. 21, 1999) (explaining the inclusion 
of "special-interest provisions" in order to pass a package renewing expired tax breaks). 
411 See GUENTHER, supranote 325, at 31 (illustrating that, in the 110th Congress, twelve 
bills were introduced to permanently extend the research credit, and another seven would 
have extended it temporarily). 
412 See, e.g., id. at 14 ("Beginning in the mid-1990s, a cycle emerged every time the credits 
were about to expire. The cycle commences when congressional and business upporters of 
the credit issue public statements calling for a permanent extension .... "); Passell, supra 
note 355 (pointing to the political consensus of lobbying to advancing the research credit). 
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supported a permanent enactment of the research credit ceding to 
the rhetoric focused on high-technology, science, and innovations.4 13 
Eventually, for budgetary reasons, Congress preserved the program 
but limited its extension to one or two more years.414 
The inertial path of the research credit became locked-in-in 
cycles of renewal and extensions-because a sufficient number of 
market players had invested resources in, and became reliant on, 
the program.4 15 It was simply too costly at this point to revert to any 
alternative route such as competitive grants, private-public 
collaborations, or the expansion of basic research programs. As time 
passed, the research program benefitted from greater positive 
feedback.416 The more that constituents used the research credit 
subsidy and supported it, the more the program received backing 
for its alleged success in spurring additional research. With every 
cycle of extension and renewal, the program enjoyed increasing 
returns of its path. As more taxpayers claimed the research credit, 
their tax professionals became familiar with its intricacies, thus 
helping to improve its operation.417 While other programs for direct 
funding and research collaborations also competed for the same 
government allocation of funding, high switching costs from the 
research credit path prioritized it over other alternative options. 
Path dependence scholars prescribe that organizations often 
exercise their influence to prevent change. 418 When organizations 
represent only certain groups of constituents, they focus on 
413 See, e.g., Joel Kurtzman, A Fed Chairman in Search of His Economic Leviathan, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 1992, at A2 ("The Perot plan proposed a bullish-on-business five-year 
moratorium on taxes for startup businesses and a permanent research and evelopment tax 
credit."); supra note 351. 
414 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 14 ("[I]n the end, Congress and the President can 
agree only on a relatively short extension of the credit, stymied by the difficulty of reconciling 
the revenue cost of a permanent extension with their other budget priorities."); GARY 
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS, 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND POLICY ISSUES 12 (2005) (explaining the "cycle" of credit 
expiration and extension). 
415 See supranotes 354-355 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra Section I.A. 
417 See, e.g., supranotes 339-341, infra notes 422-424 and accompanying text. 
418 See generally N 
orth, supra note 220 (providing an account of political evolution from an institutional 
perspective); NORTH, supra note 220, at 92-104 (considering the structure of institutions 
(rules) and their impact on the organizations that operate according to them). 
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maintaining and reinforcing the path that prioritizes the interests 
of that group. 419 During 1997, a new player entered the political 
arena when the R&D Credit Coalition (Coalition) was created to join 
forces in a cross-industry effort. Although there were already other 
coalitions that acted on behalf of technology companies, this 
coalition was the first to name itself after, and design its agenda 
around, a specific temporary legislation.420 The Coalition aimed to 
ensure that the research credit became permanent.421 This network 
was comprised of over eighty-seven trade and professional 
associations; 422 several think tanks, professional networks, 
advocacy and advisory groups; 42 3 and over 1000 companies, 
including major conglomerates such as Microsoft, Apple, and 
Oracle. 424 
419 See, e.g., Greg Hitt, BusinessesBet Dollars-to-DoughnutsThat Tactics Win Tax Breaks, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2001, at A16 (noting the groups advocating for a permanent extension 
of the research credit similar to other nations). 
420 See Savings andInvestment Provisions in the Administration'sFiscal Year 1998 Budget 
Proposal: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. 263-72 (1997) 
[hereinafter Savings and Investment Provisions in the Administration's Fiscal Year 1998 
Budget Proposal] (statement of Patrick Brennan, Vice President, Pericom Semiconductor 
Corp., San Jose, California; on Behalf of the R&D Credit Coalition) (listing other coalitions 
that followed their agenda such as the Savings Coalition of America, the Blue Dog Coalition, 
the Family Business Estate Tax Coalition, Silicon Valley Software Industry Coalition, and 
Software Industry Coalition). 
421 See R&D Coalition Rebranding Statement, R&D COALITION, 
https://investinamericasfuture.org/rd-coalition-rebranding-statement/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021) (stating that the R&D Coalition supports "a fair and robust R&D Tax Credit and 
making policymakers aware of the overall importance of research and development 
investments to the U.S. economy"). 
422 See Savings andInvestment Provisionsin the Administration'sFiscal Year 1998Budget 
Proposal,supra note 420, at 263-72 (discussing the associations within the R & D Coalition, 
such as U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Aerospace Industries Association, National 
Association of Manufacturers, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America, and 
Semiconductor Industry Association, among others). 
423 For a list of think tanks, professional networks, advocacy, and advisory groups-such 
as Business Roundtable, Financial Executives International, and Silicon Valley Leadership 
Group-who supported the R&D Coalition, see ParticipatingAssociations, R&D CREDIT 
COALITION, https://web.archive.org/web/20060719042307/http://www.investinamericasfuture 
.org/member-associations.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
424 Other companies-including HP, Texas Instruments, Honeywell, Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, DuPont, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and even 
motorcycle manufacturer Harley Davidson-participated in the R&D Credit Coalition. See 
ParticipatingCompanies, R&D CREDIT COALITION, https://web.archive.org/web/20060422210 
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The Coalition strongly reinforced the narrative that 
technological competitiveness is an integral part of economic 
growth. It advocated for extending and reshaping the rules 
governing the research credit. 425 It argued that while the research 
credit was made temporary so that industry and government could 
evaluate its operation, the program had long proven to be an 
effective incentive for companies to increase their domestic 
research.426 The Coalition emphasized that the transient nature of 
the program and the many gaps in its extension reduced the 
program's certainty and incentivizing effect. 427 In 2000, Bill Sample, 
Senior Tax Director at Microsoft and Chairman of the Coalition, 
testified about growing controversies in the administration of the 
research credit.428 He argued that compliance disagreements were 
caused by the Department of the Treasury taking unreasonable 
positions during examination, litigation, and the proposed 
regulations.429 Congressional representatives reiterated these 
concerns about the difficulty of administrating the research credit 
408/http://www.investinamericasfuture.org/member-companies.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021). 
425 See Letter from R&D Coalition to the Hon. Bill Thomas, Charles Grassley, Charles 
Rangel, & Max Baucus (Feb. 9, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20060721120837/http:// 
www.investinamericasfuture.org/PDFs/230615.pdf (urging the enactment of a permanent 
research credit). 
426 See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 95 (statement of Bill 
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition, Redmond, Washington, and Senior Director, 
Domestic Taxes and Tax Affairs, Microsoft Corporation) ("While it is understandable that the 
Congress in 1981 would want to adopt this new credit on a trial basis, the credit has long 
since proven . . . to be an excellent investment of government resources to provide an effective 
incentive for companies to increase their U.S.-based R&D."). 
427 See id. at 100 (stating that, to maximize the program's effectiveness and to sustain 
global technological competitiveness, the U.S. research community needs a stable, consistent 
research credit). 
428 Id. at 93-100. 
429 See id. at 98 (stating that IRS regulations pertaining to research expenditures were 
extremely controversial and had increased uncertainty for firms and the IRS during the 
process). The Coalition cited litigation to show that courts supported its position and 
admonished the IRS for using "positions that were clearly unsupported by the law." Id. at 99; 
see, e.g., Tax & Accounting Software Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. 
Okla. 2000) (applying 26 U.S.C. § 41 to software which has been created to be licensed 
commercially for the first time). 
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as a temporary program. 430 Sample highlighted that research 
outlays are primarily spent on salaries for engineers, researchers, 
and technicians; thus, the benefits derived from successful new 
products trickle to higher salaries for employees and a higher 
standard of living. 4 31 In 2005, Ernst & Young conducted a study on 
behalf of the Coalition that measured the effect of the research 
credit on firms that claimed it.432 They found that most companies 
utilizing the research credit were large, established 
conglomerates. 433 These studies proved that the research credit 
program was a meaningful, market-driven tool that allowed firms 
to make the choice about the types of products and technology 
investments that would heighten their competitiveness in the world 
marketplace. 434 Similar studies also posited that "a one-dollar 
reduction in the after-tax price of R&D stimulates approximately 
one dollar of additional private R&D spending in the short-run, and 
about two dollars of additional R&D in the long run."435 
430 See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 98 (statement of Bill 
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition) ("This reliance by the IRS on proposed rules, 
which are subject to further administrative actions, evidences a disregard for the 
administrative rulemaking process and inappropriate tax administration of the statutory 
provisions of section 41." (quoting a letter from Representatives Johnson and Matsui)). 
431 See id. at 97 ("The R&D credit and investment in R&D is ultimately an investment in 
people, their education, their jobs, their economic security, and their standard of living."). 
432 See generally ERNST & YOUNG LLP, SUPPORTING INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE BROAD IMPACT OF THE R&D CREDIT IN 2005 (2008) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT] 
(on file with author). 
433 See id. at 5 (" [T]he amount of tax credit claimed by corporations is concentrated among 
the largest firms .... "). In 2005, 17,700 corporations claimed $6.6 billion in research credits 
on their tax returns. Id. at 1. Of these firms, 29% had $1 million in assets or less, 25% had 
assets of $1-$5 million, 25% had assets of $5-$25 million, and 21% percent had assets of $25 
million or more. Id. Of these corporations, 14,953 had less than $50 million in total assets 
and claimed more than $891 million in research credit. Of these corporations, 71.2% had a 
Standard Industrial Classification in some type of manufacturing; the remaining 28.8% 
included Services, Information, and Agriculture. Id. at 4, 6. 
434 See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 96 (statement of Bill 
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition) ("The U.S. research community needs a stable, 
consistent R&D credit in order to maximize its incentive value and its contribution to the 
nation's economic growth and sustain the basis for ongoing technology competitiveness in the 
global arena."). 
435 See id. at 96-97 (citing to a study by Coopers & Lybrand estimating that a permanent 
extension of the research credit would create "$58 billion of economic growth over the 1998-
2010 period, including $33 billion of additional domestic consumption and $12 billion of 
additional business investment"). 
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The Coalition was an instrumental player in the research credit 
path and led the way for other legislation-oriented coalitions.436 Its 
self-reinforcement efforts were fruitful in upholding the credit's 
inertial path in the 2003437 and 2004438 Tax Cuts Acts. The Working 
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 extended the credit again until the 
end of 2005,439 and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 
prolonged the credit until the end of 2007.440 This pattern repeated 
until 2014.441 At that time, the research credit was the largest and 
most popular part442 of a group of about fifty temporary provisions 
set to expire. 443 Certain policymakers objected to an extension 
without offsetting the corresponding budgetary cost through budget 
cuts or other means. 444 They argued that the price tag of a 
permanent extension of the research credit was too high and "would 
436 See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challengesof InternationalIncome Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 
393 (2013) ("[T]he R&D Credit Coalition has become legendary for its ability to maintain R&D 
tax incentives."); see, e.g., Legislative, Regulatory, and Legal Issues Tracking, ASS'N NAT'L 
ADVERTISERS, https://www.ana.net/content/show/id/advocacy-issues-tracking (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2021) (describing the advocacy activities of the Association of National Advertisers, 
a legislation-oriented coalition). 
4" Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 301-03, 
117 Stat. 752, 758-64 (reducing taxes on dividends and capital gains). 
438 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118 Stat. 1418, 1514 
(amending incentives to reinvest foreign earnings in U.S. markets). 
4
39 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 301(a)(1), 118 Stat. 
1166, 1178 (extending the research credit from June 30, 2004 to December 31, 2005). 
440 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 104(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2922, 
2934 (extending research credit through 2007). The Act also added a simpler alternative 
method that firms could use to calculate the credit. See id. § 104(c), 120 Stat. at 2935-36. 
441 See Jackie Calmes, Obama to PitchPermanentTax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at 
22 ("As part of his pre-election push to spur the slumping economy ... President Obama this 
week will ask Congress to increase and permanently extend a popular but costly tax credit 
for businesses' research expenses ... "). 
442 See John D. McKinnon, House Votes to PermanentlyExtend Research Tax Credit, WALL 
ST. J. (May 20, 2015, 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-permanently-
extend-research-tax-credit-1432164443 ("Starting last year, congressional Republicans 
sought to extend a few of the largest and most popular ones on a permanent basis, without 
offsetting the budgetary cost through budget cuts or other means."). 
443 See Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4010, 4014 
(extending multiple deductions and credits). 
444 See McKinnon, supra note 442 (describing the political scuffle in 2015 surrounding the 
research credit). 
4
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cost the government about $180 billion over the next decade." 45 The 
year 2015 was prime for an election-year showdown. The White 
House threatened to veto a permanent research credit if funding 
was not found for highways and health care. 446 Each party accused 
its rival of irresponsible legislation. Democrats blamed the GOP for 
creating a massive budget deficit.447 Republicans accused 
Democrats of driving research jobs overseas. 448 The research credit 
was in the midst of this power struggle. After some arm twisting, a 
vote of 274 to 145 made the research credit permanent for the first 
time in its long, transient life. 449 
For over three decades, a temporary mechanism intended to 
battle entrenchment and allow legislative flexibility formed an 
inertial path that ultimately culminated in lock-in. The research 
credit was not created to allow repeated rent-extracting 
mechanisms; it was intended as a legislative experiment in research 
incentives. Indeed, its legislative history reveals that its existence 
was often questioned and necessitated extreme measures, such as 
retroactive enactments and reinstatements. Nevertheless, this 
temporary credit program involved dynamics that reinforced its 
path as a superior route, among other alternatives, to encourage 
research and experimentation. Thus, viewing the history of the 
research credit through the lens of path dependence theory 
illustrates that legislative inertia persists or dissipates not 
necessarily due to legislative intent or design, but via reactive path 
forces or lack thereof. 
445 Id. 
446 See Stephen Ohlemacher, House Votes to Make Research Tax Credit Permanent, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (May 9, 2014, 10:01 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sdut-house-votes-to-
make-research-tax-credit-permanent-2014may09-story.html (noting that the White House 
threatened to veto the House bill because "ifall the 50-plus temporary tax breaks were made 
permanent, it would 'add $500 billion or more' to the deficit"). 
447 Id. 
448 Id. 
449 In 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes 
(PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121, 129 Stat. 2242, 3040, 3049-50 that made the 
credit permanent and, for the first time, permitted small businesses to use the credit to offset 
both their regular, Alternative Minimum Tax and payroll tax liabilities. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislative inertia has come to reflect a malfunction of 
democracy. 450 Insufficient legislative time and priorities prevent 
legislatures from considering the efficacy of existing statutes in 
attaining their goal. 451 A presumption in favor of the status quo 
creates an extensive barrier for statutory action because upholding 
legislative action is more time-consuming and politically costly than 
inaction.452 The result is legislative stagnation and numerous 
obsolete rules that do not accord with present-day social 
practices. 4 53 In the search for optimal legislation, the last few 
decades saw an increasing use of temporary legislation that expires 
on its own after a set period of time.4 54 
Temporary legislation is one of the most confounding issues for 
constituents, lawmakers, and professionals. 455 Every year, Congress 
adds new expiring provisions and extends existing ones. Despite its 
vast economic impact, our understanding of expiring legislation is 
limited by explanations that rely primarily on rent-seeking, leaving 
key questions about the life cycle of temporary legislation 
unaddressed. This Article provides the first comprehensive 
explanation of this phenomenon by drawing on path-dependence 
450 See Waldron, supra note 1, at 1389 ("Of course, in the real world, the realization of 
political equality through elections, representation, and legislative process is imperfect."). 
451 See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("Capacity constraints of this kind will mean that 
there is little reason-or space-for legislative majorities to give priority to rights-based 
claims which are advanced by a relatively small minority, if those claims do not command 
strong majority support."). 
452 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (arguing that high "transaction costs" hinder 
constitutional policy change). 
453 See supranote 2 and accompanying text. 
454 See supranote 31. 
455 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Extempore, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 72, 74, 76 (2014) 
(suggesting a variety of existing practices and "contexts in which temporary law might 
provide a net benefit"); see also JointLetter: Don'tRevive the Expired Tax Extenders, COMM. 
FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (May 6, 2019), https://www.crfb.org/papers/joint-letter-time-
end-costly-temporary-tax-provisions (describing a letter urging Congress not to extend 
temporary legislation by a coalition of twelve organizations from across the political 
spectrum). Recently, scholars have also demonstrated empirically the increasing practice of 
temporary legislation. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Temporary Legislation, Better 
Regulation, andExperimentalist Governance: An EmpiricalStudy, 12 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
192, 211 (2018) (finding that temporary legislation in Israel is an "increasingly prevalent" 
legislative tool). 
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theory. It reveals that the path-dependent dynamics of temporary 
legislation often result in their own inertial force that can explain 
why some temporary provisions enjoy many decades of extensions 
and renewals, while others are kept in place for only a few years. By 
offering a deeper understanding of temporary legislation and its 
evolutionary path, this Article contributes to ongoing debates about 
the optimal design of present-day policies and the ability of 
legislatures to resist status quo bias and bring about legal change. 
Like other meta-legal theories, path dependence does not 
prescribe "mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie."456 Rather, it 
can inform legislatures about important facets of legal reality. This 
Article urges policymakers and scholars in diverse areas of the law 
to consider the ways our legal system employs path-dependence 
dynamics. In the case at hand, path-dependence theory 
demonstrates that a legal apparatus did not reduce-but rather 
exacerbated-unintended legal inertia, thus reinforcing the status 
quo bias in our legal system. It confirmed that path dynamics can 
create high switching costs that eventually achieve the opposite 
result and can entrench policies and programs regardless of their 
efficacy. 
Path-dependent dynamics may also provide normative insights 
for achieving flexible lawmaking while averting inaction. 
Surprisingly, the solution may lie in adding more expiring 
limitations rather than abolishing them. For example, Congress can 
create a new expiring rule that sets a "three strikes and you're out" 
policy by which temporary legislation cannot be extended more than 
three times. 457 In the search for optimal statutory change, 
lawmakers can adopt default rules that cause enacted, temporary 
legislation to revert to a previous iteration of law, bringing back the 
alternatives that were available before choosing that particular 
policy route. Though, this may not be desirable for either party 
because it imposes high switching costs on the legislature and 
constituents relying on the current policy. At the same time, these 
kinds of default rules may pressure legislators to reach a 
466 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 719 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
47 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 43 (proposing a mechanism of "active choosing" as a 
default rule, which would require people to overcome procrastination and incur effort costs 
that might otherwise lead them to focus on other matters). 
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consensus. 45 8 Lastly, when choosing between several policy 
alternatives, legislators can adopt a temporary rule that enables 
experimentation with policy alternatives. If one policy option is 
deemed unsuccessful by predetermined objective measures, the law 
can default to any number of set alternatives. If it is evident (via 
predetermined measures) that the first enacted policy is effective in 
achieving its goal, it should be made permanent. These solutions 
can potentially enable policymakers to gain the benefits of learning 
and experimenting with different policies while avoiding path 
dependence through irreversible switching costs. They may enable 
programs and policies to entrench due to their merits, rather than 
historical accidents. 
458 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 536 ("A penalty sunset would introduce an unpleasant 
final law that would strongly encourage future legislators to overcome policymaking inertia. 
Once legislators overcome this inertia, it is likely (though far from guaranteed) that the 
lessons learned through this statutory optimal search would be heeded."). 
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VII. APPENDIX: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Year Legislative Change 
Creation of the R&D tax credit scheduled to expire 
December 31, 1985.459 
Credit lapsed but was retroactively extended and1986 
the rate cut from 25% to 20%.460 
Credit extended for one year, but its effectiveness 
1988 was reduced by decreasing the deduction for R&D 
expenditures by 50% of the credit. 461 
Credit extended for another year, further reducing 
the effectiveness of the credit by decreasing the 
1989 deduction for R&D expenditures by a full 100% of 
the credit and introducing a focus on start-up 
companies. 462 
Credit extended for fourteen months through the 
end of 1991.463 
1991 Credit extended through June 30, 1992.464 




June30,Cre dit lapse d.466 June 30, 
1996 
469 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47. 
469 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173-75. 
461 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4008, 102 Stat. 
3342, 3652. 
462 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7110, 103 Stat. 2106, 
2322-25. 
463 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11402, 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-473. 
464 Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 102, 105 Stat. 1686, 1686. 
465 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111, 107 Stat. 312, 
420. 
466 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 18 n.25 ("The R&E tax credit has been in effect for 
each year between July 1, 1981, and the present except for period from July 1, 1995, to June 
30, 1996, when it expired."). 
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Year Legislative Change 
Credit extended for eleven months, through May 31, 
1997, but was not extended retroactively. The 
elective Alternative Incremental Research Credit 
1996 (AIRC) added, increasing its flexibility and making 
the credit available to R&D-intensive industries 
that could not qualify for the credit under the 
regular criteria. 467 
Credit extended for thirteen months and made 
1997 available for expenditures incurred from June 1, 
1997 through June 30, 1998, with no gap between 
this and the previous extension.468 
1998 Credit extended for one year until June 30, 1999.469 
Credit extended until June 30, 2004 and a modest1999 
increase in the AIRC rates was adopted.470 
2004 Credit extended through December 31, 2005.471 
Credit revised by adding a 20% credit of payments2005 
for energy research by certain qualified groups. 472 
Credit extended retroactively through the end of 
2006 2007, increased the AIRC rates, and established the 
alternative simplified credit.473 
2008 Credit extended retroactively through 2009.474 
2010 Credit extended through 2011.475 
467 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204, 110 Stat. 1755, 
1773-74. 
468 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 601, 111 Stat. 788, 861. 
469 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, § 1001, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-888 (1998). 
470 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
§ 502, 113 Stat. 1860, 1919. 
471 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 301, 118 Stat. 1166, 
1178. 
72
4 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1351, 119 Stat. 594, 1056-58. 
4" Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 104, 120 Stat. 2922, 
2934-36. 
474 Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 301, 122 Stat. 3765, 3865. 
475 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 731, 124 Stat. 3296, 3317. 
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Year Legislative Change 
2012 After a one-year lapse, the credit extended 
retroactively through 2013.476 
2014 All four components of the credit extended through 
2014.477 
PATH Act of 2015 retroactively extended the credit, 
made it permanent, and expanded credit provisions 
by allowing small businesses to take the credit 
against their Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
2015 liability for tax years beginning after December 31, 
2015 and allowing startup businesses with no 
federal tax liability and gross receipts of less than 
$5 million to take the credit against their payroll 
taxes for tax years beginning after December 31, 
2015.478 
Credit preserved and enhanced479 while eliminating 
2017 Section 199 incentives and reducing the value of the 
Orphan Drug Credit.480 
476 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 301, 126 Stat. 2313, 2326 
(2013). 
477 Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 111, 128 Stat. 4010, 4014. 
478 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121, 129 Stat. 
2242, 3049-52. 
479 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13206, 131 Stat. 2054, 2111-13. 
480 Id. §§ 13305, 13401, 131 Stat. at 2126, 2133-34. 
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